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CHAPTER-I 
Introduction 
INTRODUCTION 
Philosophy of science can be said to be as old as philosophy itself. 
Science has been regarded as a paradigm of privileged knowledge since ancient 
Greek civilisations. Science has been deemed to be systematic and reliable 
knowledge of the physical entities. It has been compared to mere opinions or 
ungrounded beliefs. Greek philosophers were the first to clearly and 
categorically take science as the most probable knowledge. 
In the west, the history of the philosophy of science begins with the 
Greek philosophers, especially with refrence to Plato and Aristotle. For Plato, 
man was blessed with an innate knowledge of everything. Learning was merely 
a process of unlocking of our innate understanding of phenomenal and non-
phenomenal realities and that knowledge was essentially eternal and universal 
and acquired through innate rational intuition. Empirical knowledge gained 
through sense-experience was considered opinion. The real knowledge could 
be advanced by recourse to deduction alone. Aristotle, on the other, charged 
Plato of utopianism and forwarding of ideals and models which did not really 
exist. As against Plato, Aristotle held that real and pure scientific knowledge 
could be achieved only by observational and inductive reasoning. Aristotle 
underlined that gathering of knowledge was a process of gaining experience. It 
was building upon what is already known to be true. In view of the same, each 
scientific discipline needed to be built upon the first principles. Thus Aristotle 
was the first thinker to clearly formulate scientific method which subsequently 
was re-appropriated by modem philosophers as well as practitioners of science 
leading to scientific achievements and breakthroughs in our times. That is why 
Aristotle as the initiator of scientific method is also credited as the father of 
science. Aristotle deemed science as a stable and deductive structure based on 
first principles. These first principles are arrived at by a process that Aristotle 
called 'induction'. For Aristotelians science is a deductive axiomatic structure 
of knowledge. It aims at causal explanations based on first principles with 
regard to essence of things. 
There is no and possibly there cannot be any complete or perfect 
definition of the philosophy of science. However, by way of illustration, we 
can bring out various dimensions or features of philosophy of science. The 
philosophy of science tries to understand the methods, products or results and 
aims and objectives of science. It attempts to furnish us a comprehensive 
understanding of the procedures, techniques and canons of scientific research 
and investigation. 
Philosophy of science is a branch of philosophy that is centred on a 
critical examinafion of science; its methods and results. Methodology as a 
branch of philosophy of science is closely related to the theory of knowledge. It 
explores the methods by which science arrives at its truths concerning the 
world. It critically explores various rationales for these methods. It explores the 
criteria of the acceptability of scientific theories. It also examines the relation 
between evidence and hypotheses. It also examines the degree to which 
scientific claims can be falsified by observational data. Other problems 
examined by the philosophy of science are the nature of scientific laws, the 
cognitive content of scientific theories referring to unobservable and the 
structure of scientific explanations. It also explores specific foundational 
questions arising out of the specific results of the sciences. For example, it 
might explore the metaphysical presuppositions of theories about space and 
time, the role of probability in statistical physics, the interpretation of 
measurement in quantum theory, the structure of explanation in evolutionary 
biology and so on. 
Historically speaking, philosophers of science have directed their efforts 
towards the discovery of pattern, system or structure in science. They have 
especially laid emphasis on discovery of order in scientific investigations. The 
universe we encounter is full of anomalies and antinomies. Finding a rational 
or systematic order across this vast spectrum is desired by almost all human 
beings. However, those who commit themselves to a systematic exploration 
and explanation of order in the universe are designated as scientists. The main 
occupation of a scientist is problem-solving with the goal of understanding the 
universe. Such an undertaking requires explanations. The quest for explanation 
is the characterising feature of scientific enterprise. Understanding of the 
requirement of an explanation is to grasp a pervasive feature of science. 
Seeking explanations is a basic feature of science. The fundamental task of 
science is to organise and systematize our knowledge of what goes on in the 
world on the basis of explanatory principles. 
Philosophers of science have been centrally concerned to work out and 
clarify the modes and methods of doing science or exploring cannons of 
rationality leading to true and objective knowledge. Philosophers such as 
Bacon, Descartes, Locke, Kant, Mill, and other philosophers of science up to 
twentieth century logical positivists, all were trying to explore cannons of 
scientific verification, confirmation and justification. They were concerned to 
explore those cannons of rationality which if followed can lead to true and 
objective scientific knowledge or which at least can lead to an understanding of 
the limits of such knowledge. 
On the simplest level, science is knowledge of the natural world. This 
knowledge is constituted by recognising the regularities in nature. For example, 
recognition of regularity in which, the sun and the moon periodically repeat 
their movements, is scientific knowledge. However, the mere recognition of 
regularities does not exhaust the full meaning of science. Regularities can be 
construction of the human mind. Human mind normally likes to explore 
regularities and uniformities and does not like to see chaos in nature; so it may 
construct regularities even when none objectively exists. 
Some philosophers of science insist that understanding of regularities 
demands explanations of scientific causes and laws. However, such a stance is 
highly debatable according to many contemporary philosophers of science. 
While modem biology thrives on causal chains, modem quantum mechanics 
has given up the causal quest. Even if causation and explanation are admitted 
as necessary, there is little agreement on the kind of causes that are permissible 
or possible in science. Now if the causes that were acceptable to previous 
scientists are unacceptable to contemporary ones, it is reasonable to assume 
that causes accepted by contemporary scientists will not be acceptable to 
scientists of the future. Therefore, the contention that science is to be 
considered as knowledge of regularities needs to be subjected to sceptical 
reasoning. 
The typical scientific mindset suspends beliefs in a position until 
appropriate evidence is obtained with regard to the truth of the proposition 
under consideration. A scientist believes in the truth of the proposition only to 
the degree that the available evidence warrants. However, the philosopher of 
science will have to point out that the nature of evidence depends upon the 
nature of the proposition. For example, a theory about the origin of the stars 
cannot be experimentally verified the way we can verify the molecular 
structure of the water. The law of universal gravitation cannot be verified the 
way laws of algebra can be demonstrated. One of the crucial functions of the 
philosophy of science is to distinguish different standards of justification of 
beliefs. The philosophers of science have to distinguish different kinds of 
proofs corresponding to different kinds of propositions. 
Science is like a dialogue between man and nature. It is the candle in the 
dark, so-to say, illuminating or clarifying our irrational beliefs or superstitions. 
Science may not guide us in courses of human action, but it can certainly 
illuminate the possible consequences of alternative courses. Science is any 
system of knowledge that is concerned with the physical world and entails 
unbiased observations and systematic experimentations. In general, science 
involves pursuit of knowledge covering general truths or the operations of the 
fundamental laws of nature. 
Philosophy and science were indistinguishable up to late eighteenth and 
early nineteenth centuries. Scientists were known as natural philosophers. In 
fact, ancient and medieval thinkers were, philosophers, theologians, scientists 
and historians all rolled into one. In the history of human thought scientific 
ontologies and methodologies grew simultaneously along with philosophical 
interpretations and theological world-views and value systems. 
Contemporary philosophers of science do not underline that science is 
entirely directed or dictated by rational methods and objective cannons. They 
can accept that a historical survey of science can reveal that science has to a 
considerable extent been methodologically directed or rationally supervised in 
its exploration of physical laws and logico-mathematical deductions. However, 
the history of science also reveals that science cannot be satisfied to be a series 
of methodologically directed programmes. Some of the most spectacular 
achievements of science have not been fully explainable in terms of the 
prescriptions of 'inductivist', 'deductivist', 'verificationist' or 'falsificationist' 
methodologies. In particular, there is mounting historical evidence that much of 
scientific reasoning has not been inductive especially in the empiricist or 
positivist sense. 
Philosophers of science since Aristotle via Bacon, Mill, Whewell, 
Duhem, Poincare and Mach have been trying to figure out the nature, method. 
function and scope of science. In twentieth century, as against philosoptiical 
accounts of science, historical investigations with regard to the development of 
science have become widely popular. Most of the people who were interested 
in philosophical issues and historical concerns of science opine that history of 
science and philosophy of science are radically different. The historian of 
science is dealing with facts and data. He wants to arrange facts and data about 
science into a convincing and coherent account with a view to providing us 
awareness about the evolution of science. By contrast, philosophy of science is 
largely understood as a normative, evolutional and a priori investigation of how 
science ought to go on. History of science deals with matters of fact with 
regard to science. On the other hand, philosophy of science is oriented to 
matters of value with regard to nature, direction, methodology and goals of 
science. The historians of science are concerned about how science has 
developed in course of time whereas the philosophy of science has been 
concerned about how science should proceed. Philosophy of science is 
concerned with foundational problems that arise within science and tries to 
understand science as a cognitive activity that is capable of providing us 
justified true beliefs about the world. It is centrally concerned with the method 
as well as goal of science. Determining the nature of science and bringing out 
its differences with non-science and pseudo-science, is also one of the crucial 
assignments of philosophy of science. Philosophy of science also tries to 
explore the nature of scientific theories and their relation to the world. It seeks 
to explore how theoretical concepts get their meaning and how they are related 
to observations. It also tries to explore the structure and content of such 
concepts as causation, explanation, confirmation, experiment, model, 
reduction, probability etc. It also tries to find out the role of values in scientific 
decisions and their relationship to social, cultural and historical perspectives. 
In Twentieth century, philosophy of science emerged as a clear, 
categorical and distinct sub-discipline of philosophy. Philosophy of science 
was pioneered by philosophically informed scientists who negotiated acute 
theoretical battles over the validity and truth of emergence of scientific 
theories. They felt the need to understand the aim and structure of scientific 
theories. They became deeply interested in understanding the role of 
hypotheses and experiments in science. They struggled to understand the nature 
of scientific jusfification and limits of scientific explanation. Philosophers of 
science and scientists such as Pierre Duhem, Henri Poincre, Ludwig 
Boltzmann, Henrich Hurtz, Ernest Mach, Max planck, Albert Einstein etc 
authored articulate methodological and philosophical books with regard to 
nature of scientific theorising and scientific method. However, three 
developments around twentieth century can be cited as instrumental in the 
development of philosophy of science. Firstly, achievements in the foundation 
of logic and mathematics exemplified by Hilbert's Geometry and Russell's 
Logic provided stimulus to the fully-fledged emergence of philosophy of 
science. Secondly, a reacfion against metaphysics such as Hegelianism by 
scientifically and mathematically inclined philosophers such as Russell inspired 
philosophers of science such as logical positivists to go in for establishing 
philosophy of science on sounder and sharper methodological foundations. 
Thirdly, revolutionary developments in the field of physics such as theory of 
relativity and quantum mechanics, generated philosophical interest in the 
nature of space, time and causality etc, leading to further stabilisation of the 
field of philosophy of science. 
One of the most critical and crucial jobs or assignments of philosophy of 
science is to examine the process of arriving at scientific hypotheses or 
formulating scientific theories. There is no royal road to discovering 
hypotheses of formulating theories. Such a process entails creative genius and 
great imagination. Scientific theories are mostly incompatible or disconcerted 
with facts of bewildering varity. Sometimes scientific theories can have equal 
capacity for explaining the relevant facts. So, there is no clear-cut method of 
determining which one of the rival theories is more acceptable. Philosophers of 
science have evolved various conditions of acceptability. They have argued 
that a hypothesis which is more significant in-terms of explaining facts must be 
deemed to be scientifically more fruitful and acceptable. Secondly, if a 
hypothesis is more testable than its rival hypotheses then it should be deemed 
to be more acceptable. Thirdly, if a hypothesis is more compatible with 
previously well-established hypotheses or is consistent with well-confirmed 
hypotheses then its acceptability is enhanced. Fourthly, a hypothesis that has 
greater predictive power from which we can deduce greater range of 
observable facts should be deemed to be more acceptable than its competing 
hypotheses. Fifthly, even when rival hypotheses can explain all the known data 
but one is simpler than others that hypothesis should be deemed to be more 
acceptable. However, there is no necessary connection between such conditions 
of acceptability of scientific hypotheses and the real worth of an upcoming 
scientific theory. Philosophers of science are aware of the puzzling features of 
this acceptability - unacceptability debate. Subsequently, they underline that 
we should be on guard while estimating the value and worth of rival scientific 
theories. 
All scientific disciplines register successive theories in course of time. 
The new theories are almost different from old ones. However, the difference 
between theories or change from old theories to the new theories cannot be said 
to be signifying scientific progress. A change can be considered a progress only 
if the new theory is certified to be a better theory or explanation of the problem 
under consideration than the previous one. Scientific progress signifies success 
of scientists in arriving at better and better theories. However, scientific 
progress is an ongoing phenomenon. It is an infinite journey dedicated to a 
complete explanation or set of explanations with a view to deciphering the 
mystery of the cosmos. We cannot even tabulate the steps or illustrate the 
procedures that can lead us to that ultimate goal of scientific research. The 
progress of science is endless in view of several reasons; firstly, there is always 
an evergrowing sophistication of scientific techniques, instruments, strategies, 
and methods of science. The quest for sophistication, precision and exactness is 
simply limitless. Secondly, even when going by apparent physical, chemical 
and biological phenomena, the world is infinitely complicated. All things or 
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phenomena have infinite properties. We can discover some of them as and 
when we succeed in cracking a problem under-consideration. However, there 
are infinitely complicated factors that intervene, making the scientific struggle 
all the more, complicated and muhi-dimensional. Thirdly, the world is 
unfathomably profoundly complex. For instance, the structure of matter 
consists of different levels. These levels are, too complicated, too complex, too 
muhi-dimensional and almost too infinite to once for all yield to us all the 
secrets. In view of these considerations, scientists should forever go on 
discovering new fundamental elements of matter along with new basic laws. 
Scientific revolutions have got to be an ongoing process. Scientific progress is 
infinite because it is associated with infinite complexity of the world. Scientific 
research cannot be taken in by the appearances. It has to go to the essence of 
the phenomena and negotiate several orders of appearances and essences. This 
process is never-ending and ever-going. At best science can be said to be 
progressing from theory to theory negotiating a series of better and better 
deductive systems. We can visualize scientific progress from problem to 
problem and the solution of higher levels can always be an ongoing process. 
Scientific problems arise out of our dissatisfactions. They arise when 
they do not yield results according to our expectations. They also arise when 
our theories entangle us in troublesome disagreements. Problems can arise 
intra-theoretically as well as inter-theoretically. They can arise when our 
theories negotiate irresolvable conflicts with our observations. However, 
theoretical constructions or formulations can arise only after negotiating the 
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problem. The crystallisation or articulation of a problem goads us to face 
challenges, to observe things in new ways and to press on for possible 
solutions. 
Science originates from problems and not from observations. Of course, 
observations are vital to the rise of problem if they disagree with our theories. 
The solution of a problem through the construction of a theory is the overriding 
concern of a scientist. Each significant new theory raises new problems; 
problems of reconciliations and problems of carrying out unthought-of 
observational tests. Scientific research is fruitful and rewarding to the extent it 
leads to novel problems. Suggestion of new problems is the most vital input to 
the development of scientific knowledge. A theory can make long-lasting 
contribution to the growth of science by suggesting new problems or troubles 
in the ongoing process of scientific research. It is through new problems that 
problems of an ever-rising profundity can be suggested to competent 
practitioners of science. Scientific research is really a circulatory journey from 
problems to theoretical constructions and theoretical constructions to problems. 
Such a circulatory process leads to ever-increasing advancement to more 
sophisticated results and findings. 
Historical examples can be cited with a view to illustrating progress of 
science. For example, Kepler's and Galileo's theoretical constructions were 
combined and superseded by Newton as Fresnel's and Faraday's theoretical 
constructions were combined and superseded by Maxwell. Newton's and 
Maxwell's theories were logically stronger and better testable. The theories of 
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Newton and Maxwell were similarly combined and superseded by Einstein's 
theories. In this ongoing process, scientific progress consisted in achieving 
more enlightening theories which were more rigorously testable and more 
simply refutable. 
Contemporary philosophers of science have advanced the arguments 
that scientific progress is not cumulative but discontinuous. Progress is a 
revolutionary process. Scientific progress consists in accepting radical new 
ideas and theories and giving up of old ideas. The most important philosopher 
of science who has underlined the revolutionary view of scientific progress is 
Thomas Kuhn. Kuhn advanced Copemican astronomy, Darwinian biology and 
Einsteinian Relativity physics as crucial examples in the history of science 
justifying revolutionary view of scientific progress. 
Scientific progress has axiological or normative connotations. Progress 
is not a descriptive term like 'change' or 'development'. Progress connotes an 
improvement with reference to some principles or criteria. Progress also needs 
to be distinguished from quality. While quality is an activity-oriented concept 
and signifies the performance of a person with reference to his talent or 
capability, progress is a result-oriented concept signifying creative 
breakthrough with reference to some purpose. One can generally hope that high 
quality research ought to lead to scientific progress. However, there is no 
necessary relationship between the quality and progress of scientific research. 
At times, even high quality research may not lead to important results whereas, 
at times, even low quality researchers can, by some turn of luck, arrive at 
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highly significant results. Scientific discoveries can signify progress when they 
lead to new ideas which may not necessarily be explainable in logical terms. 
Scientific progress can be of various types. It can be discovery of observable 
facts. It can be theoretical descriptions or tests of theories and hypotheses. It 
can be acceptance or rejection of hypotheses. It can be growth of new logical 
techniques or application of a universal theory to specific theoretical or 
practical problems. Scientific progress can be an important discovery, an 
illuminating analysis, a crucial explanation, a significant theoretical integration, 
critical development of new ideas and approaches and so on. As it happens, the 
mysteries of cosmos are inexhaustibly out there, the process of scientific 
progress has also to be an ongoing perennial affair. 
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CHAPTER-2 
(Perspectives of Scientific 
^ogress 
(i) LOGICAL POSITIVISTS: PROGRESS AS VERIFIABILITY 
Logical positivism is the philosophy advanced by Vienna circle. Moritz 
schlick, Rodolf Camap, Friedrich Wismann, Otto Neurath, Kurt Goldel, Hans 
Hahn etc. were the leading lights of the circle. Logical positivists of the Vienna 
Circle were inspired by the positivistic heritage of David Hume and Ernest 
Mach who had launched radical critiques of metaphysics and underlined the 
need for empirical investigation. Logical positivists accordingly deemed 
scientific enquiry as the model for all intellectual investigations. They were 
convinced that physical sciences were the model for other sciences and all 
natural and social sciences can be unified and reduced to physical terms. 
Logical positivists were also powerfully inspired by the logical and 
mathematical investigations of Frege, Russell and Wittgenstein. The members 
of the Vienna Circle were categorically convinced that only science delivers 
knowledge through observational and experimental verification. The 
knowledge furnished by empirical sciences, is exceptionally privileged and in 
view of the same methods of science provides the yardstick against which all 
other claims to knowledge must be measured. Accordingly, the distinctive 
slogan of logical positivists came to be known as, "the meaning of a statement 
is the method of its verification" (The Philosophy of Science An Encyclopedia, 
2006, p.459) 
Logical positivists call themselves logical for they think that their 
standpoint is necessitated by the logical analysis of language. They divide 
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linguistic discourse into two types - Cognitive and Emotive. It is the cognitive 
statements which can be said to be descriptions of truth-claims. Logical 
positivists, furthermore, divide cognitive statements as well into synthetic 
factual statements and analytic - logicomathematical statements. Only these 
two types of statements can be cognitively meaningfiil. Only such statements 
can be true or false. On the other hand, metaphysical, theological, mystical and 
ethical statements are non-cognitive or emotive statements and express our 
attitudes, feelings, emotions etc. only cognitive statements can be said to be 
meaningful statements, for meaning is the relation between an assertion and a 
fact or set of facts. Emotive statements are devoid of cognitive significance for 
they are not assertive of facts but expressions of attitudes or feelings. Emotive 
statements such as metaphysical propositions can be said to be neither true nor 
false but meaningless and non-sense (Jamal Khwaja, 1965, p.90). 
Logical positivists came to the conclusion that their criterion of 
meaningfulness, viz; non-analytic statements are cognitively meaningful or 
significant if they can be verified, makes a sharp and categorical distinction 
between science and metaphysics (Stathis and Martin, 2008, p. xxii) The single 
goal of the philosophy of science around Vienna in the 1920's was to bring out 
somehow that scientific knowledge, in contrast to metaphysics, rests on solid 
empirical foundations. Logical positivists contended that an analysis of 
language reveals the cognitive meaningfulness of verifiable scientific 
propositions only, while emotive propositions are expressions of personal likes 
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and dislikes. Knowledge can only grow by recourse to application of the 
principle of verification. 
Logical positivism like all positivistic responses to the problem of 
knowledge, has underlined that knowledge is a publically observable, 
certifiable and acceptable enterprise rather than a privately understandable 
phenomenon. The mystical, metaphysical, theological and spiritual realms of 
understanding and interpretation are beyond the pale of public scrutiny. Even 
the ethical and the aesthetic modes of projection and understanding are 
impervious to public scrutiny. What is public or common stock of knowledge 
can be methodically formulated and presented. The knowledge susceptible to 
method can be repeatedly ascertained by all competent practioners in any given 
field of investigation (The Philosophy of Science An Encyclopedia. 2006. 
P.463. Encyclopedia) 
Following Hume, Kant and nineteenth century philosophers of science, 
logical positivists brought out a clear categorical and highly radical account of 
knowledge in so far as they launched a movement with a view to finally 
undermine the cognitive claims of such classical disciplines as metaphysics, 
theology, ethics, aesthetics, mysticism, etc. Their criterion of demarcation 
between propositions of science and those of metaphysics- theology was the 
criterion of verification or verifiability. Although such a positivistic criterion of 
demarcation was, in some sense or the other, available for centuries, logical 
positivists, against the backdrop of outstanding scientific achievements upto 
twentieth century, were the most radical group of philosophers who finally 
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achieved a categorical distinction between scientific and non-scientific 
disciplines. Like Hume who castigated metaphysics to be nothing but sophistry 
and illusion, logical positivists declared metaphysics to be neither true nor false 
but meaningless and non-sense. They almost identified knowledge with 
science. To them knowledge meant scientific knowledge. Non-scientific 
disciplines of interpretation can be having considerable merits or demerits of 
their own. But, they can never attain to cognitive meaningfulness, for they can 
never be subjected to the control of experimental or methodological 
verification (Jamal Khwaja, 1965, p.76). 
The contribution of logical positivists to our clarification of scientific 
progress was making this very distinction between scientific fields of 
investigation and non- scientific realms of interpretation. They advanced a 
razor sharp principle of demarcation leading to a high level of awareness of 
what constitutes knowledge on methodological grounds. In all epistemological 
invesfigations since Plato upto logical positivists, there has been mystifying 
ambiguity as to the very nature of knowledge. Such a basic methodological 
ambiguity has always proliferated additional mystifications. Logical positivists 
brought out that some empirical reference or verifiability is inevitable while 
considering the epistemic validity of any knowledge-claim. Knowledge and 
truth are inevitably anchored on a method of verification or confirmation. Such 
a logical positivistic view has been subjected to large and wide criticism. 
However, logical positivists have succeeded in redrafting contemporary 
epistemological discourse (Jamal khwaja, 1965, p.91). 
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(ii) KARL POPPER: PROGRESS AS FALSIFIABILITY 
Twentieth century Australian philosopher of science, Karl Popper 
(1902- 1994) has made outstanding contribution to the development of the 
philosophy of science. His point of departure is his rejection of the positivistic 
criterion of verifiability replacing it by his criterion of falsifiability. He tried to 
delineate the boundary between science and non- science. The criterion of 
falsification was one of the fundamental ideas in the philosophy of Karl 
Popper. For Popper the statements which are falsifiable or potentially 
disprovable can be regarded as scientific. In view of the same, those 
proposifions which are not amenable to falsification can be regarded to be 
unscienfific. Thus metaphysical and theological propositions are not scientific 
for they are falsifiable. 
The central concern of Karl Popper was to construct a model of 
scientific rationality that could bring out the logical relationships between 
theoretical propositions and observation statements in science. Popper was an 
epistemological fallibilist. According to Karl Popper, the growth of knowledge 
has always been and presently continues to be the central problem of 
epistemology. The best way to understand the growth of knowledge is to study 
the growth of scientific knowledge (Karl Popper, 1959, p. 15.). In view of the 
same, Popper was deeply interested in the providing the line of demarcation 
between science and non-science or the demarcation between empirical 
sciences from non-empirical areas of study such as logic, pure mathematics, 
and metaphysics as well as astrological and phenological sciences. (Ibid.p.49) 
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In working out a demarcation between sciences and non-sciences, Popper 
brought out his radical opposition to the logical positivistic criterion of 
verification or verifiability. Logical positivistic identification of the 
meaningfulness and the scientific status of the proposition with its verification 
or verifiability, according to Popper, reduce a real philosophical problem to a 
trivial verbal one. Logical positivists treat demarcation as a problem amenable 
to the method of discovery. They presuppose that there is a clear-cut line 
between science and metaphysics. They ignore that metaphysical theories are 
capable of developing into scientific theories, the classical case in this regard 
being the theory of atoms advanced by ancient Greek philosopher, Democritus. 
Popper tries to furnish a non-naturalistic criterion of demarcation. According to 
Popper the demarcation between science and metaphysics cannot be a 
discovery; it has to be drawn by recourse to agreement and decision. Such a 
decision, of course, must be logically and methodologically informed 
agreement. (Ibid, p.37.) 
Popper not only rejects naturalistic approach to the problem of 
demarcation as advanced by the logical positivists, he also repudiates their 
view that science is characterised by its inductive methods and it is through a 
set of singular statements from which universal laws are supposedly inferred. 
Popper advances several considerations against the observational and inductive 
paradigm of scientific investigation. Firstly, there are no 'pure' observations. 
There cannot be a theory-free observation. There cannot be any observation 
that does not involve application of theoretical terms. All observations operate 
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within a conceptual scheme. Secondly, scientific laws are unverifiable. No 
finite number of observation statements can be logically equivalent to or can 
justify a universal proposition. Thirdly, a scientific law is never inferable from 
particular experimental resuhs. We can never have a scientific theory whose 
truth can be demonstrated at the level of experimental testing (Karl Popper, 
1965. p.46, 53). 
However, Popper advanced the view that a single genuine counter-
instance can turn out to be logically decisive. It is not possible to infer a theory 
from observation statements. However, the possibility of refuting a theory by 
observation statements remains always there (ibid.p.55). It is always possible to 
deductively infer the falsity of a universal proposition if we can determine the 
truth value of a related singular proposition. Thus, for Popper, the crucial 
inferences involved in science are deductive. We can proceed from an 
observation report such as, "this A is not X" to the falsity of the corresponding 
universal hypothesis. In view of the same. Popper's conception of the 
relationship between scientific theory and our perceptual experience was anti-
inductivist. A scientific theory can neither be logically derived from nor 
confirmed by perceptual experience. For Popper, all human knowledge 
including the most refined scientific knowledge, is falsifiable as well as 
hypothetical. Such knowledge is not a function of logical inference but of the 
creative imagination. Problem-solving is the most crucial rational activity 
carried out in science. It is through problem-solving process that new 
hypotheses are imaginatively projected and pervious theoretical frameworks 
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are rejected. The crucial role of experience in scientific research is to 
demonstrate not the verifiable truth of the theories but their falsifiable nature. A 
theory that can withstand the critical testing procedures of falsifiability can be 
deemed to be corroborated. Such a theory can be considered as preferable to its 
so-called verifiable rival theories (ibid.p.47). 
Karl Popper maintains that scientific theories are not arrived at by 
recourse to induction. A scientific hypothesis is formulated by recourse to 
creative imagination rather than an exercise carried out by an inductive process. 
A scientific hypothesis is not a passive reaction to observable regularities. We 
are not blessed by the power of pure observations. Our observations are always 
selective. They are always guided or prejudiced by some pre-theoretical 
standpoint. More importantly, the inductive process can never justify a 
hypothesis even if it is granted that we arrive at a hypothesis by way of 
inductive generalisation (Ibid.p.46). The growth of scientific knowledge starts 
with an imaginative proposal called hypothesis. A hypothesis is a matter of 
individual and unpredictable insight which insight cannot be appropriated or 
arrived at by recourse to a set of methodological rules or steps. A good 
scientific hypothesis is one that excludes some observable possibilities. If we 
have to test a hypothesis, we apply ordinary deducfive logic to it with a view to 
deriving singular observational statements from it. Thereafter, if a singular 
observation statement can be falsified the hypothesis itself stands nullified. A 
rigorous scientific test of a hypothesis will have to sustain a persevering search 
for negative and falsifying instances. All hypotheses are not equally falsifiable. 
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Those hypotheses tend to be more falsifiable which exclude more. 
Consequently they have a greater chance of being refuted. For example," All 
heavenly bodies move in eclipses" is more falsifiable than "all planets move in 
eclipses". It is so because all that refutes the second statement refutes the first 
statement as well. However, on the other hand, that which refutes the first does 
not necessarily refute the second. The proper method of science is to formulate 
the most falsifiable hypothesis. The most falsifiable hypothesis has least 
probability of qualifying to the level appropriate to scientific credibility. Those 
hypotheses that are simplest have greater empirical content. Secondly, 
scientists take great pains in their search for negative instances (Karl Popper, 
1959, P.50). 
For Karl Popper, verifiability is not the basic character of meaningful 
propositions. Rather it is the falsifiability that fundamentally characterises 
scientific propositions. The propositions of science can originate from any 
source: mythological, theological, fictional or metaphysical etc. However, the 
scienfific credibility of any proposition is determined by its falsifiability or 
capacity to be refuted. Karl Popper does not accept the notion of "manifest 
truth" as was advocated by Bacon and Descartes. Karl Popper brings out that 
arriving at an exact or unquestionable truth is not possible. Some beliefs can 
tenaciously survive for thousands of years and yet they can turn out to be 
erroneous. In view of this, the epistemology advanced by Bacon and Descartes 
sounds to be more optimistic than is warranted by the complexity of the 
situation. The advocacy of manifest truth has often led to fanaticism. The 
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advocates of manifest truth have often underlined that only most depraved 
human beings can reject manifest truth. However, a manifest truth is constantly 
in need of interpretation and reinterpretation which process often does lead to 
authoritarianism. As against the advocacy of manifest truth, Karl Popper is a 
staunch exponent of radical fallibilistic epistemology. Karl Popper regards the 
process of trial and error to be the defining condition of man. Those who are in 
search of truth have to persistently search for their errors through self-criticism. 
The existing parameters of the truth have to be radically critiqued with a view 
to gaining a measure of truth. However, it is not man's destiny to reach 
ultimate or final truth. Our quest for knowledge or truth can never liberate itself 
from prejudices, dreams, hopes, and fears. It is by persistently going on 
eliminating errors that we can hope to achieve a measure of truth. Our search 
for truth is actually our struggle for elimination for errors (Ibid, pp.49-54). 
In contrast to traditional methodological account of scientific 
knowledge, Karl Popper underlines the conjectural origination of scientific 
assertions, statements and propositions. Our fundamental assertions about the 
world are not obtained by recourse to inductive generalisations as held by 
Bacon, Mill and Logical Positivists but rather by conjecture. The Logic of 
scientific discovery is not inductive. The method of science is rather 
"Conjecture and Refutation". Inductive generalisation itself is not a logical or 
analytic principle. Therefore, any statement derived from an inductive 
generalisation can be refuted without leading to any self-contradiction. 
Observations can never yield theories which are impossible of refiitation. If it 
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were so it would have been logically impossible to refute scientific theories. 
However, as a matter of fact, scientific theories are constantly revoked in the 
light of future observations and investigations. More importantly, it is 
historically wrong to maintain that the scientific theories have emerged from 
inductive generalisation. They, rather emerge from new interpretation of 
available data or bold conjectures forwarded by creative geniuses of science. 
Observations and inductions do not lead to theories. It is rather the theories that 
lead to observations. Our observations are oriented or coordinated by scientific 
theories. The accumulations or observations are a function of the growth of 
scientific theories. New scientific theories lead to new observations which 
observations may provide further critique of scientific theories. This ongoing 
process leads to increasing authentication of scientific theories. Karl Popper 
likens scientific theories to Myth making (Ibid, p.53). Just as myths are the 
products of imagination so are scientific theories a function of our imaginative 
or creative ingenuity. When we appropriate a theory, our observations, 
interpretations and investigations are oriented to that very direction. We 
observe in the light of our preferred scientific theory. For example, it was 
Marx's creativity or imagination which forwarded or advanced the theory of 
class struggle. Thereafler, Marxists have assembled or contrived enumerable 
data with a view to supporting or authenticating the theory of class struggle. So 
is the case with Freudians. They observe repression and sublimation 
everywhere. The followers of Adler observe everywhere or in every action the 
feeling of inferiority complex. It is the theories which design the observations 
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(Ibid, p.37.). In view of the same, Karl Popper advocates that nothing can be 
grounded on pure data for there simply is no pure data. Everything comes to us 
interpreted or nothing comes to us un-interpreted. What we claim to be 
knowledge is a function of our interpretation in the light of our theories which 
theories are nothing but mythical or conjectural projections. When we critically 
evaluate these theories, they are refuted. The dialectical interplay of conjectures 
and refutations is the prime source of scientific knowledge. This is the prime 
method of advancement of scientific research as well. However, the critique or 
refutation of a conjecture is more oflen than not grounded upon a considerable 
amount of common background knowledge. This common background 
knowledge is simultaneously itself subjected to critical scrutiny. This is the 
starting point of the critical evaluation of scientific theories, for critical 
evaluation has to start somewhere. We are living in a highly complex world 
where there are no guidelines as to where to start and where to stop. We only 
come to know that there are theoretical traditions and theoretical frameworks 
which somehow go on operating successfiilly. The scientific tradition serves as 
a network or a frame of reference in our ongoing scientific investigations. A 
constant and continuous critique of our theoretical framework constitutes the 
scientific progress. 
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(iii) THOMAS KUHN: PROGRESS AS PARADIGM SHIFT 
Thomas Kuhn (1922-1996) is the most widely read and influential 
philosopher and historian of science of the twentieth century. The philosophy 
of science registered a Paradigm-Shift with Kuhn's publication of The 
Structure of Scientific Revolutions in 1962, possibly the most influential book 
in the history of philosophy of science. The book undermined the logical 
positivistic and general methodological concerns of the philosophy of science. 
Kuhn oriented the philosophy of science to look at the history and evolution of 
science. He advanced a powerful critique of Aristotle's cumulative conception 
of scientific progress. Rather, he brought out that scientific research was 
paradigm-bound and registers progress by recourse to Paradigm-Shifts (Stathis 
and Martin, 2008, p. 203). 
Thomas Kuhn advanced the view that science is a puzzle-solving 
enterprise which shows a cyclical pattern of normal science followed by crises, 
which crises is followed by revolution and which revolution again lapses into 
normal science. This kind of science resembles the normal scientific progress 
as outlined by positivistic accounts of scientific progress. During the course of 
normal science scientific progress is steady as well as cumulative. The 
scientific community does not encounter any significant obstacles or 
anomalies. During the course of normal science, scientists of all levels of skill 
and sophistication are able to contribute to the development of science. In the 
course of normal science, scientists share a lot in terms of theory, methodology, 
experimental equipment, techniques and values. During the period of normal 
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science, scientists question less and accept more. Acceptance of tiiese things is 
a pre-condition for a professional scientist. The normal science as puzzle-
solving is made possible by these very conditions. At this stage, scientists 
engage in various types of puzzle-solving such as determining the value of 
constants, equations, perfecting experimental techniques, extending the 
application of an existing theory to new instances etc. While during these 
puzzle-solving activities, scientists do not challenge or refute the basic theory 
which serves as an essential assumption of their research (Kuhn, 1970, p.24). 
In course of the pursuit of normal science problems can arise. New 
observations can show some serious deficiency in the theory. The theory may 
not be in consonance with fresh observations. New anomalies can crop up 
which may pose a threat to a theory. However, it may not lead to immediate 
abandonment of the theory. The anomalies can be regarded mere incentives for 
puzzle-solving i.e., reconciling the fresh observations with the theory. 
Sometimes, unsolved anomalies may just be postponed for later consideration. 
However, a situation can arise when anomalies get out of control and 
proliferate across the entire field of investigation. If the anomalies go on 
proliferating and posing a radical challenge to the theory, there is a 
foundational crisis and the very theory may seem to be indefensible. At this 
stage, it is difficult for the normal science to go on with its puzzle-solving 
procedures. In course of time, significant numbers of scientific researchers 
doubt the very efficacy of the theory and the ongoing puzzle-solving 
procedures and techniques seem to be too little in the face of an upcoming 
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crisis which entails a radical theoretical reconstruction or replacement. This 
sets the stage for revolution and more often than not, the old theory is replaced 
by a rival or a new theory. However, the shift to new theory, according to Kuhn 
is never a smooth affair. There is ftilly-fledged resistance from the upholders of 
the pervious theory. There are no substantial rational considerations which 
force a theory-shift. The new theory is never capable of solving all the 
anomalies previously settled by the old theory. The new theory may solve a 
substantial number of ongoing anomalies but may not be able to accord with 
the solutions of the old puzzles worked out under the previous theory. So, on a 
balance sheet of the profit and loss, the alternative theory is never beneficial 
enough to force a rational decision through which we choose to go with the 
new theory (Ibid, p. 121). 
Kuhn also talks of Pre-paradigm science. At this stage, there is hardly 
any agreement on the basics of sciences among its practitioners. At this stage 
practitioners of science are often divided into competing schools and are 
involved in disputes on ftindamental issues of theory, metaphysics, method, etc. 
Instead of solving scientific problems, scientists are often involved into 
disputes between the schools such that pre-paradigm stage comes to an end 
only when one of the rival schools succeeds in making a discovery or solves a 
shared problem in a spectacular fashion. When such a progress is registered in 
any one of the schools, followers of other schools join them in course of time. 
Such a discovery becomes the paradigm or the model of normal science, to 
begin with. Kuhn is essentially a conservative philosopher. He underlines the 
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importance of tradition in shaping out the ideas and practices of woricing 
scientists. Doing science, according to Kuhn, is essentially a normative 
enterprise. The working scientist operates within a system of values, norms and 
traditions. Kuhn underlines that scientists cannot carry on their research 
without according a measure of respect to the tradition and culture within 
which they are operating. A scientific tradition is implicitly and explicitly 
anchored on a paradigm. Scientific research demands that the scientist respects 
the paradigm he is operating within. However, scientific research also entails 
that beyond a point the scientists cultivate the courage to discard the paradigm 
as well, for in the final analysis all paradigms have their expiry date. Thus, 
scientific research, according to Kuhn, is an ongoing conflict between tradition 
and innovation. It is not the case that a single anomaly or a cluster of several 
significant anomalies do logically refute an ongoing paradigm. In view of the 
same, there is always room for rational disagreement with regard to refutation 
of a paradigm in case anomalies arise within the ongoing scientific research. 
There is also a room for rational disagreement as to whether a new paradigm 
should replace an older one. In view of the same, scientific research according 
to Kuhn is often impacted by extra-scientific considerations (Stathis and 
Martin, 2008, p.70). 
In his 'The Structure of Scientific Revolutions', Kuhn's notion of 
Paradigm became an extraordinarily popular term and has been widely 
discussed by practioners of natural science, social sciences and human sciences 
for the last fifty years. For Kuhn, the broader meaning of 'Paradigm' is a 
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consensus around a variety of components of scientific activity; key theories 
and equations, terminology, accepted mathematical techniques and 
experimental procedures. Kuhn uses 'exemplar' in the narrower sense of 
paradigm. An exemplar is a significant scientific achievement in so far as it 
leads to a puzzle-solution or set of related puzzle-solutions. An exemplar can 
crystallize support around it which can serve as a model for future research. 
The proposed puzzle-solutions in the future are evaluated according to their 
similarity to the exemplar, for there are no rules by the application of which 
judgments of similarity can be settled. The upcoming scientists are not supplied 
facts and methodological rules with a view to making discoveries. Instead they 
are trained in the use of exemplars and techniques through repeated practices. 
Through this process, the students of science are oriented to procedures 
involved in various exemplars with a view to installing in them a feel for 
scientific research. Through an understanding of exemplars the students see 
new puzzles and new puzzle-solutions and thereby acquire the necessary 
confidence and creativity needed for being involved in the ongoing scientific 
research. 
Kuhn's 'The Structure of Scientific Revolutions' has had an astounding 
impact on philosophy of science since its publications in 1962. His explanation 
of science in terms of paradigms and exemplars provided a radical account of 
science which was in contradistinction to the conception of science advanced 
by Logical Positivists who maintain that the confirmation or falsification of a 
scientific hypothesis is rule-governed. Such a rule can be explicitly written 
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down and followed algorithmically. Such a notion of inference was understood 
to be a criterion of the rationality of science. On the other hand, Kuhn 
suggested that confirmation or rejection of a scientific hypothesis is not 
governed by explicit, formal rules but by a non-formal condition of similarity 
to an exemplar. Kuhn's critics suggest that Kuhn was advancing the view that 
science is essentially an irrational enterprise. Many of his critics were 
convinced that Kuhn was advancing a relativistic view of science for scientific 
rationality and truth were relative to a paradigm rather than arrived at by 
reference to some fixed standard. However, Kuhn's intentions were different. 
Kuhn's self-understanding of his account of science was also different. He 
underlined that scientific rationality was not what Logical Positivists 
understood by it. Learning for exemplars was a wide-spread method of learning 
in diverse fields such as language, history, human sciences and social sciences. 
Learning by exemplars, therefore, could not be an irrational way of learning or 
understanding in science. 
Kuhn's 'The Structure of Scientific Revolutions' brought out how 
history of science can be deeply influential on philosophy of science. Kuhn 
showed that, a purely normative or methodological construction of science is 
impossible of formulation. Scientific conclusions are at best empirical and can 
never achieve the status of Logical demonstrations. It is better that we inform 
prescriptions of the philosophy of science by the descriptions of history of 
science. A realization of the need for mingling philosophy of science with the 
history of science led to the emergence of such academic programs in America 
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in 1960's and 1970,s that would pursue both history and philosophy of science 
simultaneously. Kuhn himself, however, was skeptical about the success of 
such a project for he thought history and philosophy require two different mind 
sets. Kuhn always complained that the picture of science forwarded by 
philosophers was not recognizable to the historians of science. 
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(iv) IMRE LAKATOS: PROGRESS AS CHANGE IN RESEARCH 
PROGRAMME (1922-74) 
Kuhn's notion of science is distinct not only from logical positivism but 
also from Karl popper's critical rationalism. Methodological falsificationism, 
as explicated in Popper's book 'Logic of Scientific Discovery', is the precise 
contribution of critical rationalism to our understanding of scientific progress. 
According to Popper a scientist's approach in the direction of chosen 
hypotheses must not be one of in search of confirming occasions but should be 
rather one of testing them thoroughly in order to find out possible refuting 
instances. In the face of a refuting instance the scientist should try to give up 
the hypothesis and search for a substitute. Scientific progress is a matter of 
repeated conjectures and refutations, new conjectures and refutations and so on 
(Lakatos, 1984,pp.90-93). 
When set in opposition to Kuhn's emphasis on the implications of 
normal science, Popper's falsificationism offers a harsh contrast. In Popper's 
view scientific progress occurs only as a result of the rejection of a hypothesis, 
while in Kuhn's account the latter occurs only during bizarre science, which is 
to say as the outcome of a scientific revolution. Thus Popper pays no attention 
to normal science and regards all progressive science as revolutionary. 
Moreover Popper regards refutation as a logical matter while Kuhn holds that 
the rejection of an old paradigm is not logically convincing and may be a 
matter over which rational divergence is possible, as a result of which a 
scientific revolution may be a long drawn-out matter. Rather than criticize 
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accepted theories, Kuhnian normal scientists take them as given and seek to fill 
in any remaining gaps in those theories or to relate them to new phenomena. 
During normal science any anomalies are characteristically abandoned rather 
than taken as grounds for rejecting the theory. Only the growth of particularly 
problematic anomalies - those that present difficulties for the very tradition of 
normal science - leads us to disbelieve with regard to paradigm theories. 
According to Popper Kuhnian normal science shows insidious conservation. 
According to Kuhn Popperian methodological falsificationism fails to match 
the facts of the history of science (Ibid). 
Furthermore Kuhn's critics regarded Kuhn as declaring that science is 
irrational. Kuhn tells us that revolutionary disputes cannot be decided by 
rational, logical argument. Kuhn says that: Individual scientists embrace a new 
paradigm for all sorts of reasons and usually for several at once. Some of these 
reasons lie outside the apparent sphere of science altogether. Others may 
depend upon idiosyncrasies of autobiography and personality. Even the 
nationality or the prior reputation of the innovator and his teachers can 
sometimes play a significant role (Kuhn, 1970, p. 152). This indicates that 
external factors may play a role within the outcomes of scientific disputes. For 
Kuhn, the most effective way of advancing a new paradigm is to illustrate that 
it solves the problem that led the old one into crisis, the role that crucial 
experiments can play. 
Kuhn's critique of rationality led Imre Lakatos to regard Kuhn as taking 
scientific change to be a matter of 'mob psychology' (Lakatos, 1970, p. 178). 
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However, Lakatos did identify tiie force of Kuhn's historical criticism of 
Popper. All significant theories have been bounded by an 'ocean of anomalies', 
which on a falsificationist view would need the rejection of the theory 
completely. In his "Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research 
Programmes" (1970) Lakatos wanted to reconcile the rationalism of Popperian 
falsificationism with what seemed to be its own reftitation by history. 
The crucial problems of the philosophy of science were taken up by 
several philosophers during the second half of twentieth century. Karl Popper 
had provided the basic texts for the debate. With the publication of Kuhn's The 
Structure of Scientific Revolutions, several problems of the philosophy of 
science became all the more debatable. Several important philosophers of 
science attempted a rational reconstruction of scientific progress which led to 
wide and large discussions about the methodological and substantive issues in 
the domain of philosophy of science. These discussions were conducted in 
several directions. Perhaps the most important direction it culminated into was 
the rational reconstruction of scientific progress carried out by Imre Lakatos 
(Lakatos, 1970, p. 177). 
Kuhn's emphasis on continuity in science was greatly appreciated and 
acknowledged by Lakatos. Historically speaking, scientists have continued 
using theories in their scientific research even in the face of refuting evidence. 
For example, scientists in nineteenth century continued to use Newtonian 
Mechanics, even when several radical anomalies were recognised in it. For 
Lakatos, such continuity did not constitute or signify irrationality as is made 
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out by Popper while outlining his methodological principles. Logical refutation 
should not be constituted as methodological rejection. Scientific theories can 
flourish even in the face of numberless anomalies (Lakatos, 1968, p. 151). 
However, Lakatos is critical of Kuhn for treating revolutionary episodes 
as instances of mystical conversion. Lakatos says that Kuhn has unnecessarily 
depicted history of science as an irrational story punctuated by periods of 
rationality. Lakatos attempts to furnish a rational reconstruction of theory-
replacement. Popper had attempted rational reconstruction, bringing out that 
scientific progress was an ongoing sequence of conjectures and refutations. 
Lakatos seeks to improve upon the Popperian reconstruction. Lakatos 
underlined that the basic unit for appraisal has to be 'Research programmes' in 
the place of individual theories. A research programme, Lakatos says, firstly, 
consists of methodological rules. Secondly, some research programmes tell us 
what paths of research to avoid, thereby, providing us the negative heuristic. 
Thirdly, some research programmes tell us what paths of research to follow, 
thereby, providing us the positive heuristic (Lakatos, 1970, p. 132). 
The negative heuristic of a research programme has the function of 
isolating a 'hardcore' of propositions, which propositions are not subjected to 
falsification. Such propositions are accepted and deemed irreftitable by the 
concerned exponents or practioners of a given research programme. On the 
other hand, by recourse to the positive heuristics, we develop strategies with a 
view to constructing scientific theories in such a way that limitations at any 
stage can be circumvented. The positive heuristic is, for all functional purposes, 
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a set of procedural suggestions. These procedural suggestions are worked out 
with a view to dealing with anticipated anomalies. When a research programme 
starts unfolding, in course of time, the hardcore of non-falsifiable propositions 
are protected by various auxiliary hypotheses. When we test a research 
programme, the full force of critical evaluation is directed at the auxiliary 
hypotheses. However, Lakatos underlines that a single negative test result does 
not invalidate an entire research programme. When we get a negative test 
result, we can modify the auxiliary hypotheses to accommodate the anomaly. 
Sometimes, the best available strategy can be to shelve the anomaly for future 
consideration. An appraisal of a research programme can be carried out against 
rules of appraisal for sequences of theories. Lakatos qualifies some sequences 
as 'progressive problem-shifts' and other sequences as 'degenerating problem-
shifts'(Ibid, pp. 13 5-6). 
A research programme is progressive if its theoretical growth presages 
its empirical growth. It is progressive if it successfully keeps predicting novel 
facts. As against a progressive shift, a research programme can also negotiate 
degenerating shift. A research programme stagnates if its empirical growth 
accelerates and its theoretical growth degenerates. When a research programme 
progressively explains more facts than its rival research programme, it can 
supersede and even eliminate its rival. Within a given research programme, we 
can replace a theory by a better theory, a theory that has great empirical content 
in comparison its predecessors. However, it is extraordinarily difficult to 
exactly pinpoint as to when a research programme outcompetes its rival 
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research programme. Neither a logical proof nor an experimental verification 
can dislodge a research programme instantly. A better research programme can 
falsify its rival research programme. However, such a falsification can be 
declared only with hindsight. Pending falsification, two rival research 
programmes can exist together at the same time. Even more than two 
programmes can flourish simultaneously (Ibid, pp. 116-18). 
A research programme is relatively autonomous. A research programme 
does not become rejected with the emergence of counter-evidence. As a 
research programme has some degree of autonomy, it can ignore counter-
evidence. Such ground realities make scientific progress rational. A research 
programme can continue to exist even in the face of large number of anomalies 
and counter-instances. We can carry on with a research programme by 
bracketing up the anomalies for a while. It may become rational to carry on 
with the positive heuristic of the programme for the nature of scientific 
problems is defined by its positive heuristic rather than by confronting 
anomalies (Ibid, p. 138). 
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(v) FEYERABEND: PROGRESS AS THEORY CHANGE 
Paul Feyerabend (1924-1984) was an eccentric and creative philosopher 
of science. He was critical of the very possibility of philosophy of science. 
Besides, he was a critic of positivism as well as falsificationism. He also 
critiqued all rationalist attempts to prescribe or explore rules of scientific 
method. He designated his view of science as 'anarchistic', underlining the 
rejection of the dogmatic use of rules. 
Feyerabend was powerfully impacted by Ludwig Wittgenstein and Karl 
Popper. In his critique of logical empiricist philosophy of science, Feyerabend 
interpreted scientific theories with refrence to Popperian conventionalism. He 
argued that the question of theory-choice or theory-replacement is not a dispute 
to be settled by rational arguments. It is, actually, a matter of choice. It is up to 
us to decide whether a theory is a description of reality or we can decide to 
designate it as an instrument of prediction. It depends on our ideas of scientific 
knowledge and our aspirations of and expectations from science. Such disputes 
are to be decided by the consequences of theories. Philosophical theories do not 
merely reflect science but change it as well. Our forms of knowledge can be 
changed to fit our standards. 
According to Feyerabend, there is no pure or unalloyed observation 
language. Every so-called observation language is grounded upon a meta-
physical ontology. Furthermore, the theories we hold influence our language 
and even our perceptions. So long as we feel committed to a particular theory, 
we become incapable of envisaging alternative accounts of reality. Thus a 
41 
scientific theory may also be, in course of time, reduced to an irrefutable 
dogma or myth (Feyerabend, 1981, p.2). 
Feyerabend is a defender of realism. According to him, "the 
interpretation of a scientific theory depends upon nothing but the state of affairs 
it describes" (Ibid, p.2). He acclaims Wittgenstein's Philosophical 
Investigations according to which book the meaning of terms is determined by 
the role they play in the wider context of a theory. It is our theories which 
determine the interpretation of an observational language. It is through theories 
that we try to explain our observations. If the theories change our 
interpretations and explanations also change. Realism interprets theories as 
universally quantified statements. Thus it leads to scientific progress rather 
than stagnation. According to Feyerabend, only realism allows us to live upto 
the highest intellectual ideals of critical neutrality, honesty and testability (Ibid, 
p.31). For Feyerabend realism is desirable because it demands the production 
of new and incompatible theories. When new incompatible theories are 
proliferated the empirical content of the theories is enhanced. A theory's 
testability is relative to the number of potential falsifiers it has. It is through 
production of alternative theories that we can certify the existence of possible 
falsifiers. Scientific progress is a fiinction of theoretical pluralism. When we 
allow a plurality of incompatible theories, the competition thereof will maintain 
an even enhance the testability and also the empirical content of the theories. 
When various theories are tested against one another, all of them are forced to 
develop through competition. 
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According to Feyerabend, all our statements beliefs and experiences are 
hypothetical. Our experiences and observations always need interpretations. It 
is through different theories that we appropriate or arrive at different 
interpretations. All observational statements implicitly embody theoretical 
principles such an exercise requires us to change the meanings. Thus all words 
operate within a diffused framework of semantic instability instead of semantic 
stability presupposed by positivistic accounts of reduction, explanation and 
corroboration. Progress in science demands violation of semantic stability. If 
meaning is determined by theory, terms in very different theories cannot share 
the same meaning. If we want to derive the principles of an old theory, from 
those of a new, one must either not succeed at all or must negotiate a change in 
the meaning of the terms of the old theory. Any theoretical reduction is more 
like replacement of one theory and its ontology by another. In view of the same 
any formal account of explanation or corroboration is precluded by semantic 
instability. Feyerabend has brought out a radical rejection of the idea that 
scientists are rational rejection of the idea that scientists are rational creatures 
and nothing more. In his celebrated book 'Against Method', Feyerabend argues 
that scientists do not in fact follow any one given method. They are less 
rational then their propaganda constitutes them to be. There are no 
exceptionless methodological rules governing the progress of science. There 
are no rules governing the growth of knowledge. The history of science is 
complex. We cannot develop a general methodology with regard to scientific 
research. The only method that is corroborated by history of science is 
'Anything goes'. If we follow logical empiricist methodologies or Popper's 
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critical rationalism, we would inhabit scientific progress by imposing 
restrictive conditions on new theories. Imre Lakatos does not fear any better 
than logical positivists or Karl Popper. His methodology of Scientific Research 
Programmes is full of ungrounded value judgments about what constitutes 
good science. His methodology is reasonable to the extent it is disguised 
epistemological anarchism. It was Feyerabend's life-long ambition to 
undermine the so-called privileged status of science within contemporary 
global culture. He argued that there is no scientific method justifying science as 
the best way of acquiring knowledge. Science prevails only because "the show 
has been rigged in its favour" (Feyerabend, 1978, p. 102). Feyerabend brings 
out that science is far closer to mythology than can be admitted by philosophers 
of science. It is not necessarily the best form of thought developed by man. Its 
conspicuousness, noisiness and impudence do not necessarily make it 
inherently superior. Only those who have uncritically accepted science and its 
ideology can deem science to superior to other forms of knowledge 
(Feyerabend, 1975, p.295). 
Feyerabend recommends that just as we have separated church from 
state, so we should separate science and state. We need to setup a free society 
in which every tradition of knowledge is equally respectable and equally 
proximate to the centres of power (Feyerabend, 1978, p.9). As Feyerabend sees 
it science is a threat to democracy. We ought to control science through 
democratic power. We also ought to cuhivate intense scepticism with regard to 
scientific experts. Such experts too must be accountable to and controllable by 
democratic institutes. 
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(vi) STEPHEN TOULMIN: PROGRESS AS RATIONALITY 
Toulmin (1922-2009) is a twentieth century philosopher of science. In 
his book "The Philosophy of Science" first published inl953, Toulmin tries to 
explore the nature of arguments in the science. He especially laid emphasis on 
the question of the rationality of the scientific discovery. Toulmin has provided 
an anti-positivistic account of the rationality of science. He has underlined that 
scientific arguments as well as the arguments advanced in many other fields 
except the pure sciences are impervious to description or explanation in terms 
of formal logic. The specific character of scientific enterprises can neither be 
captured by deductive nor inductive methods of inference. It is especially the 
case with those scientific practices or enterprises that culminate into new 
discoveries. Toulmin brings out that the basic or fundamental purpose of 
science is not the discovery of the objective true knowledge. Science rather 
tries to furnish us with new foresights of understanding of the world through a 
relevant theory. For example, Toulmin characterizes physics as presenting a 
new way of regarding old phenomena. The scientific discoveries do not 
necessarily reveal new or unknown facts. A scientific breakthrough is 
essentially rather an interpretation in a new or different way of what we are 
already aware of (Toulmin, 1967, p. 16). 
According to Toulmin, in scientific investigations or discoveries, the 
pivotal rule is played by the method of representation (Toulmin, 1967, p31). 
The method of representation means a sort of graphical, pictorial image of a 
given physical phenomenon. The mathematical models perform this role on a 
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more sophisticated level. According to Toulmin such pictorial, graphical or 
geometrical models were widely worked out during the early history of science. 
The community of scientists during early centuries of modem sciences was 
deeply oriented towards the acceptance of proffered scientific solutions by 
recourse to conventional graphical representations. Various scientific fields of 
investigation such as optics, physics, chemistry etc can be shown to have been 
historically deeply impacted by geometrical and trigonometrically models. 
Toulmin suggests that even very abstract mathematical models play a role 
similar to the pictorial methods of representation. They may be said to be 
counterparts of geometrical images (Toulmin, 1967, p.32). 
Toulmin stresses that scientific investigations of nature are not carried 
out by scientists as natural unmediated observers; rather they are equipped with 
some fundamental intuitions with regard to the ways of representing the 
phenomena under consideration. They try to employ those representational 
methods better suited in terms of their explanatory power. Toulmin underlines 
that when physics claims that "Heat is a form of motion" or that "Light travels 
in straight lines" or that "X-rays and light-waves are varieties of electro-
magnetic radiations", he is not stating the pure facts or discovering anything 
which can factually ascribed to reality. Any scientific discovery is worked out 
or appropriated through a given method of representation. Toulmin writes: 
"The heart of all major discoveries in the physical sciences is the 
discovery of novel methods of representation, and so of fresh techniques by 
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which inferences can be drawn and drawn in ways which fit phenomena under 
investigation" (Toulmin,1967, p31). 
Toulmin's ideas about scientific discoveries do contribute to the way we 
understand scientific discoveries and arguments. As a philosopher of science, 
he brings out the Hmits of methodology, especially its formal methods. It is 
Toulmin's conviction that formal methods cannot be of great help while trying 
to understand the nature of scientific practice. According to Toulmin, the 
scientist has to go beyond methodology and formal logic with a view to doing 
science. A scientific discovery is not a function of methodological instructions 
or formal algorithms. It is rather a function of professionally trained 
imagination that is able to negotiate any real breakthrough. In the final analysis, 
the scientists have to go beyond the formal procedures. A scientist may use 
highly sophisticated and impeccable computational techniques and yet a given 
model may not be applicable in a given context culminating in erroneous 
reasoning. 
Toulmin compares scientific reasoning with juristic reasoning. Like 
jurisprudential reasoning, scientific reasoning also leads to results by achieving 
consensus within a community of scientists. Scientific reasoning cannot be 
applied with the principles of logic. Scientific reasoning like legal reasoning is 
not automatically applied as such but requires a thorough examination of 
adequacy of the rules with reference to the specific character of a given 
situation. Like legal regulations, scientific laws too are not universal by 
definition but need to be suspended or changed in the light of given 
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circumstances. The situation of a scientist resembles the situation of a judge for 
both of them negotiate cases or disputes which are complex or are quite new 
and cannot be successfully explained by pervious rules and methods. But the 
scientists and the judges, in such cases, resort to informal modes of reasoning. 
They weigh reasons and ponder over the significance of the complexities 
involved in their respective fields of operations. When they face a problem 
which cannot be explained in terms of available rules and laws they have to go 
beyond a current established system. Sometimes specific situations entail the 
revision and redefinition of the whole old paradigm. Thus a new scientific 
paradigm and a new legal paradigm may emerge in the hands of a creative 
scientist or a creative jurist. 
Toulmin develops a critique of the procedures of formal logic and 
especially the rules and cannons of formal rationality. He challenges the 
relevance of these rules of rationality in arriving at new and significant 
discoveries. Each science, according to Toulmin, develops its working logic 
independently of the universal and idealised logic (Toulmin, 1958, p. 146).A 
scientist basically works with the methods of representation which are not 
universal by definifion. In view of the same, it is always reasonable to qualify 
our arguments and conclusions. 
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CHAPTER - 3 
Larry Laudan 's: l^eory of 
Scientific ^ogress 
LARRY LAUDAN'S THEORY OF SCIENTIFIC PROGRESS 
I. Research Tradition: 
Laudan's (1941) most important contributions to the philosophy of 
science can be found in his book Progress and its Problems (1977). In 
Progress and Its Problems (1977), Laudan rejects several time-honored 
assumptions of previous philosophy of science, including the notions that 
scientific progress requires (1) a fixed methodology; (2) the cumulative 
retention of the successes of earlier theories; and (3) a convergence on "the 
truth." Laudan argues that since we have no way of determining to what extent 
our scientific theories about unobservable entities are correct, it is irrational to 
believe that any of our theories are even partially true. Laudan, unlike Paul 
Feyerabend, does not abandon scientific realism for relativism after denying 
that we can justifiably make any claims about theoretical truth. For Laudan, 
scientific realism only requires us to accept the practical benefits of using 
theoretical terms in a realist manner. It requires us accepting semantic realism 
only. However, scientific realism does not require believing that any of those 
terms actually corresponds to some reality. Nor does scientific realism receive 
support from the abductive argument, popularized by Hilary Putnam in the 
1970s, that only a scientific theory's approximate truth could explain its 
practical success. As Laudan points out in "A Confutation of Convergent 
Realism" (1981) and Science and Hypothesis: Historical Essays on Scientific 
Methodology (1981), most past scientific theories enjoyed much empirical 
success without being true at all; and many scientific theories might, for all we 
know, actually be close to the truth without enjoying much practical success. 
Scientific realism cannot be defended by the principle that "if a scientific 
theory is true, then it will be successful," any more than a simplistic 
pragmatism could be defended by the principle "if a scientific theory is 
successful, then it is true." 
Broadly speaking, Larry Laudan makes a distinction between two types 
of theories. More often than not, we use the term 'theory' with a view to 
denoting a specific set of doctrines. In such a context, the theory can be utilised 
for making specific experimental predictions. A theory in this sense does also 
provide a detailed explanation of natural phenomena. Such theories as 
Maxwell's theory of electromagnetism, Einstein's theory of photoelectric 
effect, Marx's labour theory of value, Wegener's theory of Continental Drift, 
and the Freudian theory of the Oedipal Complex etc can be cited as examples 
of this type of theory. On the other hand, the term 'theory' also refers to 
general, hardly testable, sets of doctrines or assumptions. For example, theory 
of evolution does not refer to a single but to a whole spectrum of theories. It 
refers to an entire family of doctrines that are historically and conceptually 
related. Laudan cites, 'quantum theory' as an instance of a theory which refers 
to a large set of doctrines. 'The quantum theory' includes quantum field 
theories, group theories, s-matrix theory and renormalized field theory. Such a 
theory is christened by Laudan as 'Scientific Research Tradition'. A specific 
theory is provided by the research tradition. While a specific theory touches an 
empirical problem with a view to solving it, answers to empirical problems 
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come from the research tradition. The solutions of the problems emanate from 
a research tradition. It is through the research tradition that we understand the 
locus standi and modus operandi of any problem under consideration. We can 
locate a problem within a research tradition. We can work out a solution within 
a research tradition (Laudan, 1977, p.71-2). 
Understanding entails the ontological and methodological dimensions of 
the problems under consideration. A research tradition provides such an 
ontological and methodological understanding. The development of specific 
theory takes place within a set of guidelines furnished by a research tradition. 
The guidelines can be ontological i.e. understanding the types of entities within 
which a research tradition is embedded. The specific theories within a research 
tradition try to explain all the empirical problems within the ontological 
framework of the research tradition. For example, if we are operating within 
the research tradition of behaviourism, only legitimate entities which 
behaviouristic theories can postulate have got to be physical and psychological 
which are directly and publically observable. If we are operating within a 
Cartesian research tradition, the theories have got to be about mind and matter 
only. Other types of entities are unacceptable within a Cartesian research 
tradition. A specific research tradition also brings out different modes by which 
entities under consideration can interact. For instance, entities within Marxist 
research tradition can only interact by virtue of the economic forces influencing 
them (Ibid, p. 79). 
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A research tradition often specifies and stipulates legitimate 
methodological procedures within that tradition. The methodological principles 
can accommodate experimental techniques or theoretical testing and evaluation 
techniques or any other appropriate mode of understanding the domain of 
scientific research. Thus a scientist working in Newtonian research tradition 
will have strong inductivist biases. He will espouse only those theories which 
have been inductively arrived at form an appraisal of the relevant data. On the 
other hand, a behaviouristic psychologist would go in for the operationalist 
mode of procedure. Thus a given research tradition is comprised of certain 
ontological and methodological guidelines. One can repudiate a particular 
research tradition by abandoning the metaphysics and methodology of that 
tradition. One can break from the ontology and methodology of a given 
research tradition. Such deviations or violations are not necessarily unwelcome 
in the account of scientific progress advanced by Larry Laudan. Such 
deviations and violations have, at times, inaugurated revolutionary break-
through in the history of scientific thought. He, however, stipulates that when a 
scientist tries to solve any empirical problem, he must be operating within the 
framework of some research tradition. It is so because we understand a 
scientific problem within a given research tradition. We just cannot have any 
good or bad understanding of a problem under consideration without locating it 
within the context of a given research tradition. Accordingly, Laudan would 
define a research tradition as follows; a research tradition is a set of general 
assumptions about entities and processes in a domain of study, and about the 
52 
appropriate methods to be used for investigating the problems and constructing 
the theories in that domain (Ibid, p.80-1). 
Broadly speaking, a research tradition is comprised of two vital 
components. Firstly, a research tradition advances a set of beliefs about what 
sorts of entities and processes make up the domain of enquiry. Secondly, it 
advances a set of epistemic and methodological norms. Or we can say it brings 
out as to what is to be investigated and how it is to be investigated; what is the 
object of scientific investigations and how theories are to be tested and data to 
be collected etc. However, research traditions are immune to direct testability. 
Firstly, their ontologies are so general that they cannot yield any specific 
predictions. Secondly, their methodological rules and norms do not pertain to 
matters of fact and furnish us any testable assertions. However, a research 
tradition can be useful in various ways. Firstly, it can indicate a set of 
assumptions which are beyond controversy and constitute background 
knowledge to all scientists operating in that tradition. Secondly, it can help in 
identifying those components of a theory which pose trouble and need to be 
modified. Thirdly, it can stipulate rules with a view to collecting of data and 
testing of theories. Fourthly, it can advance conceptual difficulties against any 
theory which derelicts from the ontological and epistemic assumptions of a 
given tradition (Hacking, 1981, p. 150-51). 
Any research tradition is engaged with empirical problems by recourse to 
formulation of specific theories. Any given specific theory advances an 
explanation of an empirical problem, in the process, facilitating a solution to 
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the problem under consideration. However, specific theories themselves are 
furnished by the research tradition. We need to appreciate that our 
understanding originates from the tradition. Our specific theories are also 
provided by the tradition and we engage with empirical problems by recourse 
to these very theories. Such a modus operandi sometimes culminates into the 
solution of the problems under investigation. 
Every research tradition is associated with various specific theories. 
Every specific theory is designed to illustrate the ontology of the research 
tradition. Each specific theory will be empirically testable. It will entail some 
precise predictions about the phenomena in any given field of research. As 
against theories, a research tradition is not either explanatory or predictive or 
testable. The entire role of a research tradition is to furnish us with the crucial 
tools for solving empirical as well as conceptual problems. The more 
successful a research tradition is, the more adequate solutions of empirical and 
conceptual problems it does offer (Laudan, 1977, p.81-2). 
Laudan brings out that specific theories are not necessarily entailed by a 
given research tradition. Similarly, research traditions too are not necessarily 
entailed by the specific theories. At the most, a research tradition can prescribe 
a general ontological and methodological framework with a view to solving 
given problems pertaining to any domain. A specific theory, however, 
illustrates a specific ontology. It also articulates a number of specific and 
testable laws about nature. If we are told by nineteenth century mechanical 
research tradition that heat is simply a form of motion, we shall neither 
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deductively conclude Boltzmann's version of the Kinettc^Ji^^ 
arrive at statistical thermodynamics. Similarly, it is impossible to deductively 
derive a research tradition from all the theories thereof. 
According to Laudan, there are two specific modes indicating the 
relationship between theories and the research tradition. One mode is historical 
and the other is conceptual. Historically speaking, most scientific theories have 
been formulated when the scientists concerned were operating within a specific 
research tradition. If we go through a historical development of various 
theories, we can always trace the research tradition with which a specific 
theory was allied to. Tracing such a relationship must always be considered as 
one of the most important facts of the past (Ibid, p. 86). 
Nevertheless, a research tradition impacts its constituent theories in 
various ways: 
Firstly, a scientific problem is determined by the research tradition. A 
research tradition strongly impacts the formulation of the scientific theories. It 
influence's the range and weight of the empirical problems which specific 
theories will have to negotiate with. Our decision as to what can count as 
genuine problems for specific theories will be oriented by the ontological 
position and the methodological guidelines of the research tradition. It is the 
research tradition which figures out the relevance of empirical problems in a 
particular field of research. It is for the research tradition also to decide which 
problems fall outside of a given field of research and which problems are 
pseudo-problems. Laudan brings out that Cartesian mechanical research 
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tradition deeply transformed the domain of optical theories in the seventeenth 
century. Previously, problems pertaining to perception and vision had been 
regarded as legitimate empirical problems for any optical theory. The Cartesian 
tradition argued that such problems do not genuinely belong to the domain of 
optical theories. They should be relegated to such disciplines as psychology 
and physiology. Thereafter, such empirical problems were simply ignored by 
the mechanistic optical theorists (Ibid, p. 86-7). 
Secondly, Laudan underlines that the fiinction of a research tradition is 
the establishment of an ontological vision and methodological guidelines which 
can tackle with the problems in a given domain of research. In this way a 
research tradition operates as a constraint on the theories. It can provide us the 
clues as to which problems can be developed within a given research field. For 
example, if a research tradition is strongly inductivist or observationlist, it 
cannot accept specific theories postulating unobservable entities. In nineteenth 
century, various subtle fluid theories and atomic theories etc were strongly 
opposed because the then dominant methodology did not approve of the 
epistemic and scientific soundness of various theories dealing with 
unobservable entities (Ibid, p.89-91). 
Thirdly, the heuristic role of a research tradition cannot be 
underemphasised. A research has also a heuristic role to play with regard to 
construction of specific theories. The specific theories are not deducible from 
the research tradition. However, a research tradition can furnish vital clues for 
theory construction. Laudan brings out that before developing a theory of light 
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and colours, Descartes specified that bodies have only such properties as those 
of shape, size and motion. It is true that he did not specify the shapes, sizes, 
positions and motions of particular bodies, although he categorically clarified 
that all specific physical theories would have to specifically negotiate only with 
these four parameters. In view of the same, Descartes was aware that his 
optical theories would have to be negotiated across such parameters. 
Accordingly, he tried to explain colours in terms of the shape and rotational 
velocity of certain particles. His research tradition clearly assumed that the 
particles of light are exactly like other material bodies; he was convinced that 
his theoretical analysis of light could benefit by the application of general 
mechanical theories. 
A research tradition can play another heuristic role. Such a heuristic role 
becomes all the more clear when constituent theories have to negotiate 
modification. Any research tradition worth its salt will have to have crucial 
guidelines about modification of theories, which can improve its problem 
solving efficacy. For example, to begin with. Kinetic theory of gases negotiated 
crucial predictive failures. However, the research tradition was enormously 
flexible. Such flexibility paved the way towards possible modifications. 
Kineticists introduced molecular spin to alert their assumptions about 
molecular elasticities., with a view to accommodating seeming energy losses 
by greater degree of freedom. Such strategies become possible by regarding 
matter as possessing a molecular and mechanical composition. The theoretical 
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anomalies are resolved by such a heuristic role of a research tradition (Ibid, 
p.92). 
Fourthly, rationalisation or justification of theories is one of the most 
crucial functions of a research tradition. More often than not, specific theories 
make assumptions about the nature which are not ftiUy warranted by the 
supporting data. Such assumptions are mostly about basic causal processes and 
entities. The existence and operation of these processes and entities are taken 
for granted by specific theories. Laudan stresses that only a research tradition 
can work out a justification of such assumptions. For example, Sadi Camot 
while developing his theory of steam engine presupposes that no heat was lost 
in performing the work of driving a piston. This assumption was not rationally 
justified by Camot. He did not feel a need to do that. It was the primary 
postulate of the Caloricist research tradition that heat was always conserved. In 
view of the same, Camot presupposes certain things about his theory which the 
theory itself could not establish. It is the general assumption of the Caloricist 
research tradition that heat is never lost in whatsoever circumstances. In this 
way, by playing a heuristic role, a research tradition can significantly promote 
our understanding of scientific problems. Such an understanding can 
significantly promote the solution of the problems under consideration as well 
(Ibid). 
Fifthly, a research tradition provides us the rationale of theory choice. 
The aim of science is the resolution or clarification of problems. Another 
cmcial implication of this account is that scientific progress is not parasitical 
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upon rationality. Historically speaking, rationality has been understood as a 
temporal concept. It was assumed that we can determine the rational credentials 
of statements or theories independent of any knowledge of their background or 
evolution. Scientific progress is deemed to be fully dependent upon the 
rationality. Progress implied adherence to an ascending order of rational 
beliefs. The problem with such an account of science is that progress is readily 
understandable whereas rationality is not that clearly identifiable. 
II. Problem-solving Effectiveness: 
Science is not an aim less enterprise. Its aim is problem-solving. From 
this perception, the rationality of theory-choice is problem-solving 
effectiveness. Such rationality is not transcendental to scientific activity. It is 
imminent in the very scientific activity itself. If, scientific advancement can be 
defined in terms of problem-solving, then such advancement can be said to be 
the rationale of theory-choice. It means, progressiveness is determining 
rationality rather than rationality determining progressiveness. If a problem can 
be effectively solved by a theory, then such a theory is rationally acceptable. 
However, when we say that a problem has been solved? The answer to such a 
question is not independent of the research tradition within which a scientist or 
a group of scientists are operating. It is the research tradition which stipulates 
the nature and status of the problems. It is the research tradition which informs 
us about rules of appraisal and about relevant methodological criteria. With the 
change of a research tradition, the change of rationality of theory choice also 
takes place. Here the rational is progressive and progressive is rational. 
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Theories which are effective in problem-solving can be said to be progressive 
and rationally acceptable. In such an account of science, the rationale of a 
theory choice is problem-solving effectiveness. 
Determinate the 'problem-solving effectiveness' of a theory is simple. 
We measure such effectiveness by recording the problems solved by a 
particular theory in comparison to other competing theories. At this point, 
Laudan classifies problems into three types; solved problems, unsolved ones, 
and anomalous instances. It is the solved problems which determine whether a 
theory is effective than its rival. Only by the record of solved problems can we 
measure effectiveness of the theory. However, unsolved problems should not 
be deemed to be insignificant, for it is unsolved problems that are transformed 
into solved ones. However, in appraising the relative merits of theories, 
unsolved problems are irrelevant for it is only the solved problems that matter 
with regard to theory evaluation (Ibid, p. 21-22). 
Now that we assume that problem-solving effectiveness is the aim of 
science, we can shift our attention to the model of progress. Such a model, 
according to Laudan appropriates certain simple assumptions: (1) The solved 
empirical or conceptual problems constitute the basic unit of scientific 
progress; (2) Science aims at maximization of the scope of solved empirical 
problems and minimization of the scope of anomalous and conceptual 
problems. If a theory claims to have problem-solving effectiveness, it will have 
to be determined by its record of solved problems in comparison to unsolved 
ones. The overall problem-solving effectiveness of a theory is determined by 
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assessing the number and importance of the empirical problems which the 
theory solves and reducing the number and importance of anomalies and the 
conceptual problems which the theory generates. The effectiveness of a theory 
can also be a function of the modification of the theory under consideration. If 
a theory can illuminate some troublesome anomalies or resolve some 
conceptual problems, its effectiveness can be said to be registering the highest 
scale. As the aim of science is problem-solving, and the progress can be 
registered only if successive scientific theories register an increasing degree of 
problem-solving effectiveness (Ibid, p. 69). 
A specific research theory may at times be progressive and at times non-
progressive. In comparison to such theories, a research tradition (RT) is a 
productive one. We can hold a specific research tradition accountable with 
regard to the number of specific theories. In view of the same, only a research 
tradition can have the character of effectiveness. Thus, 'problem-solving 
effectiveness' of a theory means 'problem-solving effectiveness' of a research 
tradition. We can replace one (RT) by another (RT). Accordingly, we can say 
that a (RT) is the unit of scientific change. Only an ongoing research tradition 
can register important and substantive changes. 
Thus, the 'problem-solving effectiveness' has actually to be the rationale 
for a tradition choice. The reason of such a theory or tradition choice has to be 
relative to the milieu. A given research tradition does also accommodate the 
ongoing or contemporary conceptual problems. Laudan claims that it was not 
irrational of Aristotle in forth century B.C to claim that physical science ought 
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to be subordinated to or be legitimated by metaphysics. Thomas Aquinas was 
not stupid or prejudiced while espousing the view that science ought to be 
compatible with religion. The view that science is not independent of religion 
or metaphysics itself constitutes a research tradition. In view of the same, it 
may be perfectly rational in twentieth century to appropriate the very same 
view. However, if a belief is rational in our times or in our age, it does not 
necessarily entail that it was rational at other times and places. More often than 
not, quite the reverse results might be arrived at. There simply cannot be a 
research tradition which can claim to be capable of dissolving the problems 
universally and eternally (Ibid, p. 131). 
Making a choice between two theories entails that these two theories 
under consideration are comparable with each other. We can apply the rationale 
of theory choice only if theories under consideration are comparable. As the 
ontological and methodological assumptions are supplied by the research 
tradition, we just cannot have a theory-free observational language. How can 
then, two research traditions be deemed to be comparable? For Larry Laudan, 
scientific theories can operate without the buck up of the observational 
language or correspondence rules. However, there is a genuine problem as to 
how we can demonstrate that different theories actually are dedicated to 
resolving the same or similar problems? 
Larry Laudan provides a straightforward answer to this question. 
According to Larry Laudan, the terms in which a problem is characterized will 
generally be dependent upon the acceptance of a range of theoretical 
62 
assumptions. Such assumptions can or cannot constitute the theories leading to 
the solution of the problems under consideration. If a problem can be 
characterized only within the language and framework of a theory that claims 
to solve it, then categorically it can be brought out that no competing theory 
could be said to be solving the same problems. However, there can be 
situations where the theoretical assumptions characterizing the problem under 
consideration are different from the theories that attempt to solve it; it can be 
safely assumed that the competing explanatory theories are addressing 
themselves to the same problem. Larry Laudan brings out that scientists have 
been reflecting since ancient times to explain why light is reflecting off a 
mirror according to a regular pattern. This problem of reflection involves many 
quasi-theoretical assumptions, such as, that light moves in straight lines, that 
certain obstacles can change the direction of a ray of light, that visible light 
does not continuously fill every medium etc. There is no necessary 
inconsistency between the problem-solving theories and those theoretical 
assumptions required to solve the problem. In seventeenth century, several 
conflicting were theories of light addressing them to the problem of reflection. 
All optical theories were deemed to be solving the problem of reflection. 
Laudan suggests that scientific problems can be solved by paying 
attention to shared problems which competing research traditions do encounter. 
The shared problems provide a basis for rational appraisal of the relative 
problem-solving effectiveness of competing research traditions. Sometimes, 
two theories agree to expect some particular problems as a solved one. 
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Sometimes, it can happen that a problem may be considered as solved one by 
one theory but not by another. The question that arises can be as to how we can 
measure the relative merits of two theories. Laudan responds to this question 
by saying that since rationality consists in accepting the research tradition 
having highest problem-solving effectiveness, and appropriate determination of 
the effectiveness of a research can be made within the research tradition itself 
and not with reference to any other tradition, our criteria or norms will be 
determined by observing whether a research tradition has solved the problems 
that it set for itself or whether it generated any anomaly or conceptual problem 
while solving a problem. Or whether in course of time, it has expanded the 
domain of solved problems and minimised the scope of anomalies. Laudan is 
hopeful that if we adopt this procedure and observe the functioning of all basic 
research traditions, we should be able to construct a progressive ranking of all 
research traditions at a given point of time. Laudan is thus convinced that it is 
possible, in principle, to be able to compare the progressiveness of different 
research traditions even when the traditions under consideration are radically 
incommensurable in terms of the fundamental truth - claims they advance with 
reference to the universe (Ibid, p. 143-46). 
III. Changing Research Tradition: 
Laudan brings out that change of a research tradition takes two distinct 
forms. Firstly, a research tradition can change by a modification of some of its 
subordinate or specific theories. Such changes are registered within research 
traditions on a continuous or ongoing basis. It often happens that researchers 
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discover within the framework of the tradition a more effective theory for 
deaUng with some of the phenomena. They can reaUse that slight alteration in 
pervious theories or modification of boundary conditions or proportionate 
revision of constants or minor terminology refinements can improve on the 
problem-solving effectiveness of any of the theories within the research 
tradition. Once a more significant or improved theory is discovered, the 
preceding theory is immediately dropped. In this way, any progressive research 
tradition, exhibits a long fluctuation of specific theories. Secondly, a research 
tradition evolves by change of some of its basic or core elements. A look at 
great research traditions in the history of science such as Aristotleanism, 
Cartesianism, Newtonianism etc will reveal that none of these traditions did 
have any interesting set of doctrines. For example, several Cartesians 
repudiated the identification of matter and extension. Huygens admits the 
possibility of void space, yet he remains a Cartesian (Ibid, p.96-7). However, 
more importantly, in course of scienfific development, a research tradition itself 
changes. The ongoing research traditions and the theories advanced by them 
face numerous problems. New anomalies are discovered and fundamental 
conceptual problems are encountered. The advocates of an ongoing tradition 
find it difficult or even impossible to illuminate such anomalies and conceptual 
problems by recourse to modification of specific theories within the tradition. 
Laudan says that in such a situation, the proponents of a research tradition try 
to explore what minimal changes in the methodology and ontology of the 
tradition can illuminate the anomalies and conceptual problems. However, it is 
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not always possible to square out the problems by recourse to minimal short-
cuts. At times, scientists find it impossible to water down any of the 
assumptions of a research tradition with a view to illuminating its anomalies 
and conceptual problems. At this stage, scientists have the choice to abandon 
the tradition. However, the scientists fight to the maximum possible extent and 
try to solve the anomalies and conceptual problems of the tradition by 
introducing one or two modifications in the core assumptions. Thus, they try to 
preserve a research tradition to the extent it is possible (Ibid, p. 98-9). 
According to Laudan, a research tradition can negotiate a natural 
evolution. Such an evolution is neither refutation of the formal tradition nor the 
creation of a new tradition. A research tradition may negotiate numerous 
evolutions in its historical development. Such ongoing evolutions over a period 
of time can eventuate numerous discrepancies between the methodological and 
ontological dimensions of the earlier and later formulations. Michael Faraday 
radically reformulated Newtonian research tradition. Sometimes we may not 
see any degree of similarity between earlier and later stages in the development 
of a tradition. Nevertheless, it may remain the same research tradition. 
Now the question arises as to how be us to understand the replacement of 
one tradition by another if the tradition continues to be in course of historical 
development? Laudan states that at any given time certain elements of research 
tradition are more central to, and more deep-rooted within the tradition than 
other elements. It is these more central elements, which are taken, at that 
occasion, to be more characteristic of the research tradition. To abandon them 
66 
is indeed to move outside the tradition, while the less central tenets can be 
modified without repudiation of the research tradition. But what are the 
unrejectable elements and how are they rejected? He says, when it can be 
shown that certain elements, previously regarded as essential to whole 
enterprise, can be abandoned without compromising the problem-solving 
success of the tradition itself, these elements cease to be a part of the 
unrejectable core of the research tradition (Ibid, p. 99-100). So, it is the old 
tradition out of which the new emerges. The old one changes into the new 
tradition. Research traditions differ with one another. New traditions emerge 
out of old in course of historical evolution. All successive stages do have 
continuity during their ongoing march. 
We can raise the question as to how a theory can respond in the face of 
an anomaly. Can we say that a break has been registered in the change and 
continuity of a theory? According to Laudan, the happening of an anomaly 
raises doubts about, but need not compel the abandonment of theory exhibiting 
the anomaly. For him, this is because of two reasons: (1) in any empirical test, 
it is an intricate combination of a variety of theories that is essential for 
deriving any experimental prediction. For instance, in order to test a theoretical 
statement as simple as Boyl's law, we must raise queries about the behaviour of 
our measuring instrument. Boyl's law by itself predicts nothing whatever about 
how these instruments will behave. Now in this condition, if the prediction 
turns out to be incorrect, we do not know where to locate the error within the 
complex. It follows that we can never rationally claim that any theory has ever 
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been refuted (Ibid, p.41). We cannot decide that one particular theory within 
the network is completely false. On the other hand, to abandon a theory 
because it is incompatible with the data assumes that our knowledge of the data 
is infallible and veridical. But once we realize that data itself is only probable, 
the occurrence of an anomaly does not necessarily require the abandonment of 
a theory. (2) One of the most cognitively significant activities of scientists is 
the successful transformation of a presumed empirical anomaly for a theory 
into a confirming instance for that theory. There are many instances in history 
of science that anomalous instance has turned out to be the confirming one. For 
example, Front's view was that all the elements were composed of hydrogen 
and consequently the atomic weights of all elements should be integral 
multiples of the weight of hydrogen. Berzelius and others found that several 
elements had atomic weights incompatible with Front's theory. These results 
constituted very serious anomalies for Proutian chemistry. But discovery of 
isotopes and refinement of techniques enabled physical chemists to separate out 
the isotopes of the same element. Each isotope was found to have an atomic 
weight that was an integral multiple of hydrogen. Frevious anomalous results 
could now be explained on Front's hypothesis. Thus, the very phenomenon that 
had earlier constituted anomalies for Front's hypothesis becomes positive 
instance for it (Ibid, p.24-31). That is why Laudan says, a scientist can adhere 
to a theory of less effectiveness in the hope that he will improve it. He holds 
that the choice of one tradition over its rival is a progressive choice precisely to 
the extent that the chosen tradition is a better solver than its rivals. He entitled 
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this sort of appraisal the context of acceptance. A further mode of appraisal is 
context of pursuit. There are many historical cases where scientists have 
investigated and pursued theories or traditions that were potentially less 
acceptable, less worthy of belief, than their rivals. Scientists often begin to 
pursue and explore a new research tradition long before its problem - solving 
success qualifies it to be accepted (Ibid, p. 109-10). Prout did not leave his 
theory as he saw it in anomalies. He was rationally justified in doing this, for a 
scientific theory aims at problem-solving and Prout did not leave his theory as 
he saw it in anomalies. He was rationally justified in doing this, for a scientific 
theory aims at problem-solving and Prout also aimed at problem-solving while 
adhering to the theory. His adherence to the theory culminated into a very 
important progress of science. Registration of progress does not definitely 
mean repudiation of a theory. Researchers can have their rational justification 
for the espousal of an old scientific view. 
Such rationality, according to Laudan, is precisely what is known in 
scientific parlance as 'promise' or 'fecundity'. Daltonian atomism generated so 
much interest in the early years of the nineteenth century largely because of its 
scientific promise rather than its concrete achievement. At Dalton's time, the 
dominant chemical research tradition was concerned with elective affinities. 
But Dalton's early atomic doctrine could claim nothing like the overall 
problem-solving success of elective affinity chemistry; still worse Dalton's 
system was confronted by numerous serious anomalies. But this does not entail 
that atomists shall not be able hereafter to explain these apparent anomalies in 
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satisfactory manner. Although most scientists refused to accept the Dahon's 
approach, many nonetheless were prepared to take it seriously, claiming that 
the serendipity of the Daltonian system made it at least sufficiently promising 
to be worthy of further development and refinement. Sometimes, a research 
pursuit can appear to be regressive. However, there are grounds to suggest that 
it can always be a rational pursuit (Ibid, p. 111-14). 
According to Laudan, a scientist can also pursue his research in two 
research traditions with a view to accelerating the problem-solving 
effectiveness of his pursuit. There are two ways in which different research 
traditions can be integrated. In some cases one tradition can be grafted onto one 
other. Thus, in eighteenth century natural philosophy, many scientists were 
simultaneously Newtonians and subtle fluid theorists. Their adherence to the 
research tradition of subtle fluid led them to postulate imperceptible aetheria 
fluids in order to explain the phenomena of electricity, magnetism, heat, etc. 
Their Newtonianism led them to assume that the constituent particles of such 
fluids interacted not by contact but rather by means of strong forces of 
attraction and repulsion, acting-at-a-distance across empty space. These two 
major researches fiised into another research tradition, which is christened as 
materialistic framework of research. Therefore, it is highly erroneous to assume 
that a working scientist cannot operate within a couple of research traditions 
simultaneously. 
However, there are problems which must be faced squarely. While 
mingling two or more than two research traditions, we need to repudiate some 
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of the fundamental elements of each of the traditions under consideration. In 
these cases, the new tradition, if successful, requires the abandonment of its 
predecessors. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, geological followers 
of Hutton were hammering out a new tradition, which drew on elements of 
Caloricist heat theories and Vuleanist geology. In course of time, these research 
traditions could not be preserved in their pristine form. In view of the same, 
Huttonians had to hammer out the evolutionary research tradition. These 
traditions combined previously incompatible elements, quite successfully (Ibid, 
p.104-5). 
Laudan points out that, broadly speaking, philosophers of science agree 
that cognitive progress is possible if we acquire knowledge by recourse to 
purely cumulative theories. Cumulative theory means a theory which may add 
to the store of solved problems, but which never fails to all the problems 
successfully solved by its predecessors. Put somewhat differently, a necessary 
condition for one theory, T2, to represent progress over another, Tl, is that T2 
must solve all the solved problems of Tl and some excess content. So a series 
of theories is progressive if each later member in the series must entail all the 
corroborated content of its predecessors and some excess content. 
However, such a problem of scientific progress is hardly corroborated by 
the actual onward march of history. Prior to Hutton, Cuvier and Lyell, 
geological theorists had been concerned with a very wide range of empirical 
problems, such as how deposits get consolidated into rocks; how the earth 
originated from celestial matter and slowly acquired its present form; when and 
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where the various animals and plants originated; how the earth retains its heat; 
the subterraneous origins of volcanoes and hot springs and the origin and 
constitution of igneous rocks. Solutions of varying levels of adequacy had been 
offered in the eighteenth century to each of these problems. However, after 
1830, particularly with the emergence of stratigraphy, there were no serious 
geological theories, which addressed themselves to many of the problems 
mentioned above. Laudan argues that does it mean that geology was not 
progressive between 1830 and about 1900? Whereas geological theories after 
Cuvier and Lyell successfully addressed themselves to a very different set of 
empirical problems, including those of bio-graphy, stratigraphy, climate, 
erosion, and long-sea distribution. The same is illustrated within physics by the 
failure of Newton's optics to solve the problem of refraction in Icelan spar 
which had been explained by Huygens optics; and by the failure of early 
nineteenth century caloric theories of heat to explain phenomena of heat 
convection and generation, which had been solved by Count Rumford in the 
1790's. Within chemistry, many problems had been solved by the early 
theories of elective affinities that were not solved by Dalton's later atomic 
chemistry. A still better example is offered by Franklinic electricity theory. 
Prior to Franklin, one of the central solved problems of electricity was the 
mutual repulsion of negatively charged electrical bodies. Various theories, 
especially vorticular ones, had solved this problem by the 1740's. Franklin's 
own theory, which was widely accepted from the middle to the end of the 
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eighteenth century, never adequately came to grips with this problem (Ibid, 
p. 150). 
In view of the same, Laudan christens' progress as an aim-theoretic 
concept. To say, that 'X represents progress' is an elliptical way of saying 'X 
represents progress towards goal Y'. If our concern is with problem-solving, 
we can meaningfully speak of progress without reference to accumulation. 
Assume, for instance, that Tl has already solved problems a, b, and c, while T2 
solved a, b, d, f, and g. If our cognitive aim is to possess solutions to the largest 
number of problems, then clearly T2 is progressive in comparison to Tl 
(Laudan, 1996, p. 119). In problem-solving model of progress we assess the 
number and the weight of the empirical problems a theory is expected to solve. 
Similarly we assess the number and weight of its empirical anomalies. 
Ultimately, we measure the number and centrality of its conceptual difficulties. 
Constructing the appropriate scales, our principle of progress tells us to prefer 
that theory which comes closest to solving the largest number of important 
empirical problems while generating the smallest number of significant 
anomalies and conceptual problems (Hacking, 1981, p. 149). Scientific progress 
does not necessarily entail that we fully satisfy the condition of accumulation. 
Thus, for Laudan, the fundamental scientific products are research 
traditions. According to Larry Laudan, there are two types of theories. One of 
them denotes a specific set of related doctrines which can be utilized for 
making specific experimental predictions and for giving detailed explanation of 
natural phenomena; for instance, theory of electromagnetism. By contrast the 
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term 'theory' also denotes much more general, much less easily testable, set of 
doctrines or assumptions; for instance theory of evolution or Kinetic theory of 
gases. In this case we are referring not to a single theory, but to a whole 
spectrum of individual theories. The term 'evolutionary theory' for instance 
does not refer to a single theory, but to an entire family of doctrines that are 
historically and conceptually related. This kind of theory is the primary tool for 
understanding. Larry Laudan calls this type of theory scientific research 
tradition. Problem selections, heuristics, standard of appraisal etc., all are 
determined by research tradition. According to Laudan, scientific research 
starts from encountering of a problem and ends with the solution of that 
problem. So, scientific activity is problem-solving activity. It is rational to 
accept a research tradition which has greater problem-solving ability in place of 
research tradition which has less problem-solving ability; problem-solving 
effectiveness is the standard of judgement in theory choice. Therefore, for 
Laudan, scientific change is rational and progressive. 
IV. Scientific Problems: 
In Laudan's model of scientific progress, the solution of the problem is 
defined as progress. For Laudan, science is essentially a problem-solving 
activity. Science is an enterprise which is problem oriented. If it can be 
established that scientific research aims at solving the problem, then we will 
have to give up that truth is the aim of scientific discourse. Such a stand is 
radically anti-realistic. Laudan's anti-realism is grounded on his emphasis that 
science is essentially a problem oriented enterprise or a problem-solving 
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activity. Laudan's philosophy of science gives up truth as the aim of science. 
According to Laudan scientists work on problems of science which problems 
are not objectively out their but experienced or felt as tensions by the working 
scientists. Scientific problems demand solutions and scientific theories are 
constructed to solve these problems. Theories just try to provide adequate 
solutions to problems. Thus scientific problems may be said to be the questions 
of science and scientific theories may be said to constitute the answers. 
Scientific theories try to resolve ambiguities and reduce irregularities into 
uniformities. They show the intelligibility and predictability of scientific 
enterprise. It is in this sense that scientific theories constitute solutions to 
scientific problems. The crucial test for any theory is whether it provides 
acceptable answers to interesting problems or whether it provides satisfactory 
solutions to important problems. Scientific theories aim at solving the problem 
felt by the scientists (Laudan, 1977, p. 13). 
According to Laudan, scientists feel various types of problems, such as 
hard-core scientific problems or empirical problems, intra-scientific problems, 
normative problems and world-view problems. For example, when we observe 
that heavy bodies fall towards the earth with regularity and ask how and why 
they so fall, we pose an empirical problem. Similarly, when we ask an 
explanation as to why Alcohol left uncovered in the glass disappears, we pose 
an empirical problem. When we ask why the offspring's of plants and animals 
bare striking resemblance to their parents, we raise an empirical problem. 
Anything about the natural world that strikes us as odd or otherwise in need of 
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explanation, Laudan says, constitutes an empirical problem (Ibid, p. 14-5). 
Empirical problems can be unsolved or solved or anomalous problems. 
Unsolved problems can be resolved in course of time. A solved problem can be 
counted in favour of a theory. An anomalous problem does not mean a 
falsifying instance. The hallmark of scientific progress is the transformation of 
anomalies and unsolved empirical problems into solved ones. As against 
empirical problems, scientific researchers can also face conceptual problems. 
Laudan cites the astronomical contributions of Ptolemy. He says the criticism 
against Ptolemy did not question its adequacy to solve the chief empirical 
problems of observational astronomy. The criticism was directed against the 
conceptual credentials of the mechanism Ptolemy used for the solution of 
astronomical problems. We also experience a conceptual problem when a 
theory is discovered to be logically inconsistent and self-contradictory 
Conceptual problems may also arise from ambiguity or circularity. 
Intra scientific problems can arise when one scientific theory can go 
counter to the theory accepted in other parts of science. One of the most 
powerful arguments put forward against Copemican Astronomy was that it 
runs counter to the fundamentals of highly established physical theories. Intra 
scientific conceptual problems emerge because scientific disciplines can never 
get completely independent of one another. It is so because problems within the 
domains of physics, chemistry, biology, astronomy etc always criss-cross and 
interpenetrate. Normative problems can also arise in the scientific domain. 
Science is conducted by rational agents and has to have certain aims and goals. 
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There are crucial problems with regard to the articula^pft'^ rKiy/poffpfj^ j^  
those goals. It is through an appropriate methodological strategy that we can 
achieve some clarity as to what or what not should be done by the scientists 
with a view to achieving the cognitive, epistemic and practical goals of the 
scientific research. Historically speaking, such normative issues have been 
responsible for great debates and controversies with regard to theory 
acceptance. As science is goal-oriented activity and goals and methods are 
settled by scientific minds, human goals finally operate within scientific 
domains. In view of the same, great methodological controversies have cropped 
up in the history of science on grounds of both method and purpose. Science 
according to Laudan also experiences what may be called world-view 
problems. These problems arise when a particular scientific theory is seen to be 
incompatible with some other body of accepted beliefs. As it happens, our 
religious and cultural beliefs and values go beyond the scientific domain. For 
example, the mechanistic theories of physics were discarded by various 
philosophers of sixteenth and seventeenth centuries for such theories were 
incompatible with teleological and theological explanations and interpretations 
inspired by Christianity during those times. 
However, for Laudan, the central task of scientific research is to solve 
problems. In fact, all our scientific achievements are solutions of problems. The 
essential role of science is to find out solutions to the problems, be it empirical 
or conceptual. Science can have various aims and objectives and individual 
scientists can have various motivations for carrying out scientific research. 
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However, for all practical purposes, Laudan underlines, all scientific research 
culminates into solutions to ongoing and emerging problems of science. The 
solution of a problem, however, according to Laudan can never claim to be an 
attainment of truth. It is true that from beginning of scientific research, to our 
own times, achievements of science have been nothing but solutions of the 
problems. These solutions are considered as achievements of science. Scientific 
progress is defined to be maximising the solutions of the problems and 
minimising the amount of anomalies and unsolved problems. So, scientific 
progress means progress in solving the problems. However, the solutions of 
problems do not amount to achieving the truth. They do not represent the real 
picture of the world. Scientific problems and solutions are not beyond space 
and time. They are temporal and spatial problems and solutions. With changing 
times, the problems as well as their solutions register a drastic reappraisal and 
reformulation. Perfect adequate solutions to scientific problems of today are 
deemed utterly inadequate solutions by tomorrow. What counts as a solution to 
a problem at one time may not necessarily be regarded as such at all times. 
Laudan underlines that a research tradition may be highly successful in 
solving problems. However, it does not mean that the research tradition is 
confirmed as true. Problem-solving capacity does not tell us anything about 
truth or falsity of a tradition. A research tradition may be highly successful at 
proliferating fruitful theories and yet it may suffer from huge ontological and 
methodological flaws. It can also happen that a particular research tradition is 
grounded on sound ontological and methodological positions and yet is 
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incapable of generating theories that can solve urgent problems of 
contemporary scientific research. Rejection of research tradition signifies only 
a tentative decision to go in for an available alternative that can prove to be 
more successful at solving problems (Ibid, pp.82-3). As it happens, in course of 
historical evolution of science, the success of a theory is highly suspect if the 
theory is linked to an unsuccessful research tradition. Conversely, even an 
otherwise inadequate theory, will score high on social acceptability if it is 
associated with a highly successful research tradition. What it amounts 
according to Laudan is that success of a tradition cannot be regarded as the 
basis of its truth, and so, failure of a research tradition does not necessarily 
constitute its falsity. In view of the same, Laudan underlines, a research 
tradition should not be judged in terms of truth or falsity. Research traditions 
are products of history. They are created for solving the problems. They are 
articulated in a particular intellectual context and like other historical products; 
they register both rise and fall in course of time. Like other historical products, 
they originate, develop, achieve success or face failures and finally die or 
peterout and cease to be regarded as serous instruments for scientific progress 
(Ibid, p.96). A scientific theory can never negotiate truth as a recognisable goal. 
As rational agents, scientific researchers should have a publically recognisable 
goal. If the goal is achieved, it should merit public celebration or 
acknowledgment. Therefore, truth finding should be discarded as a goal of 
science as a scientific theory can never culminate into a recognisable truth-
attainment event. So truth can never be a goal of science or the goal of an 
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individual research (LeplinJ, scientific realism p. 196). Historical accounts of 
science tend to ascribe transcendental properties such as truth or certainty as a 
goal of science. If science is truth oriented, we can never know which scientific 
theory is true or approximately true and which is not. We can never bring out to 
characterise a theory as truth-like nor do we have an epistemic criterion on the 
basis of which we could legitimately judge one theory to be truer than the other 
(Hacking I, op.cit, 1981, p. 145). 
According to Laudan, scientific research originates in the face of 
scientific problems. It ends the solution of a problem is accomplished. So, 
problem-solving effectiveness is the central or crucial criterion with regard to 
the acceptability or unacceptability of a scientific theory or a research tradition. 
It is rational to accept a research tradition which has greater problem-solving 
effectiveness, in comparison to a research tradition which has less problem-
solving ability. We have to make a theory choice on the basis of problem-
solving effectiveness of a research tradition or a particular scientific theory. So, 
any genuine scientific change, for Laudan, is rational and progressive. The 
fundamental aim of scientific research is solving the problems; nothing more, 
nothing less. A research tradition, according to Laudan, is the primary tool of 
understanding and determines which problems are significant for our research. 
The solution of these problems does not entail truth. In the face of problem-
solving effectiveness or effectiveness of a theory, the truth or falsity of a theory 
gets irrelevant. Scientific problems are essentially challenges to our intellectual 
capacities and capabilities and are not necessarily bothered about the 
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appropriation of the objective truth. A scientist operates within a research 
tradition and it is within that research tradition that solutions to the problems 
under consideration can be found and personal satisfaction registered. There 
are no universal and eternal solutions to scientific problems for there are no 
universal and eternal problems of science as well. Problems and solutions 
register fluctuations in course of historical evolution. In course of time, the 
changes have got to take place and these changes are rationally directed by 
scientists as far as humanly possible. Truth is impossible of attainment, 
according to Larry Laudan and cannot be set as a goal to scientific research. 
However, science is rationally directed problems in terms of a quest for 
solutions to problems. 
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CHAPTER-4 
ConcCusion amCCtiticaC 
AppTaisaC 
CONCLUSION 
I have just worked out a sketch of various accounts of scientific progress 
advanced by Logical Positivists, Karl Popper, Thomas Kuhn, Lakatos, 
Feyerabend and Stephen Toulmin. I have mainly concentrated on Larry 
Laudan's account of scientific progress which is the central theme of this 
dissertation. Now, before we develop a brief critical overview of Larry 
Laudan's account of scientific progress, a brief recapitulation of this 
dissertation would be in order. 
The Positivists are perhaps best remembered for their efforts to promote 
the unity of science. They promoted the idea that there was one language of 
science, a unity of method that becomes codified as a hypothetico-deductive 
method. This is often interpreted to imply that there is also a unity of laws that 
generated a reductionism with physics as the most basic science serving as a 
foundation for chemistry, biology, and psychology and the other social 
sciences. Correlative with this reductionist world-view was a commitment to 
what become known as the covering-law model of scientific explanation. 
Associated with the covering-law model of explanation is a hierarchical model 
of explanatory connections that can be labelled the "Layer Cake" model. The 
basic idea is that there are observational facts; for example, about charge a 
distributions, chemical reactions, embryonic developments, animal behaviours 
and so on. At the next level up, there will be empirical generalizations about 
these phenomena. The third stage will include even more general statements 
connecting the generalizations at the first level. At some stage, theoretical 
constructions will be introduced. At some level, the sociological laws and 
theories will be subsumed under the psychological laws and theories, and they 
in turn will be subsumed under laws of chemistry and finally under laws of 
physics. This procedure is conceived as continuing indefinitely. Each rise in 
level brings greater systematization to the body of established scientific 
knowledge and constitutes scientific progress. 
In the I930's, Karl Popper developed an alternative to the positivist 
picture of science. Popper accepted the positivist view of the nature of theories 
and the importance of hypothetico-deductive method but parted company with 
them on what he saw as the crucial question of how scientific claims are to be 
validated. The positivists adopted the view that theories were to be validated by 
being confirmed by evidence. Measures of confirmation were generally taken 
to be probability measures of some sort. In a choice between two theories, the 
rule was: choose the theory that is most probable given the evidence. Popper 
rejected this approach in favour of emphasizing the falsifiability of scientific 
claims. In this view, the job of the scientist is to subject hypotheses and 
conjectures to the severest possible tests and to provisionally accept those that 
passed the most severe. 
For Popper, the philosopher of science is a methodologist whose job is to 
propose a series of methodological rules that will promote the growth of 
knowledge, that is, the discovery of general laws. These methodological 
choices are partially a matter of adopting certain conventions based on value 
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assumptions about the aim and nature of science. For Popper, the appropriate 
choice is the methodology that maximizes the solution of interesting problems. 
The result encourages methodologies that involve bold conjectures and severe 
testing of hypotheses. The severe tests to which hypotheses are to be put is a 
function of a critical method that promotes rational change. Indeed, Popper 
identifies 'being rational' with 'being critical'. In this way, the progress of 
science, insofar as it is produced by a critical evaluation of hypotheses, is a 
rational endeavour. 
Popper's evolutionary model of scientific change consists of conjectures 
and refutations. Problems give rise to hypotheses that are then subjected to 
serve tests. If the hypothesis fails to pass those tests, it is rejected and another 
conjecture takes its place. The cycle of testing and assessing brings new texts 
and assessments. If the hypothesis passes one severe test, then there will always 
be others more severe yet. Theories or conjectures that pass such severe tests 
are said to be corroborated. The degree of corroboration of a theory is a 
measure of how well it has stood up to severe tests in the past. But it says 
nothing about the likelihood of the theory notwithstanding future tests. So. in 
what sense is the most highly corroborated theory the best choice in a given 
situation? Popper's argument for identifying the most highly corroborated 
theory as the best goes along line like these: 1). the rational choice is the best 
choice, 2). It is always rational to choose the option that has been severely 
tested, and survived, because those theories are the ones that have been 
subjected to the severest criticism. (For Popper, to be rational is to be critical.) 
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3). In the case of theories, it is rational, then, to choose that theory among the 
competing options that is most highly corroborated. Therefore, 4.) The best 
theory is the most highly corroborated one. 
The most highly corroborated theories also "track" the truth, in the sense 
in which Popper argued, viz; a measure of closeness to the truth that is called 
"verisimilitude" could be defined. With such a measure, it would be possible in 
principle to determine which of a set of alternative conjectures represented 
genuine scientific progress. This proposal generated an extensive literature 
designed to refine and validate such a measure. For the most part, such 
attempts to construct viable measures of verisimilitude have come to naught, 
although there are still defenders of this approach as the best method for 
judging scientific progress. 
The Growth of a scientific discipline, in Kuhn's view, follows a standard 
pattern of different stages. In his earliest formulation of this stance, it is 
possible to distinguish five stages that characterize the progress of science. 
These are: 1. Immature science. 2. Mature (normal) science. 3. Crisis science. 
4. Revolutionary science. 5. Resolution; normal science resumed. 
The cycle then repeats itself through stages 2-5 indefinitely. Central to 
Kuhn's view is the notoriously slippery concept of a "paradigm", or 
"disciplinary matrix". A disciplinary matrix is the overall collection of 
methods, formulae, rules, procedures, and commitments that govern scientific 
research. Kuhn came to distinguish four major components of disciplinary 
matrices: symbolic generalisations, models, values, and exemplars. These are 
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the shared standard examples that give "content" to the abstract principles of 
the disciplinary matrix. The exemplars are the fundamental units in the matrix 
and are the basic tools by which the scientist working in a normal science 
tradition advances the range of phenomena rendered by law to the basic 
principles and theories of the tradition. 
In structure, immature science is characterized as pre-paradigmatic. 
Later, Kuhn argued that no research occurs in the absence of paradigms. 
Immature science is the science that is characterized by paradigms, which for 
some reason or other; fail to generate a "puzzle-solving" tradition. The shift 
from immature to mature science is then seen as a shift from a paradigm that 
"leads nowhere" to one that provides a context of unsolved puzzles and 
problems such that some hope exists for solution. 
Mature (normal) science is thus a problem-solving tradition. According 
to Kuhn, most scientists spend most of their lives working in such traditions. 
The normal science tradition seeks to extend and entrench tried-and-true 
theories and practices. Progress at this stage consists in increasing the number 
of systems that can be understood in terms of the fundamental exemplars of the 
theory. However no theory or paradigm successfully solves all its problems. 
Problems that resist assimilation to the techniques of the paradigm are labelled 
'anomalies' when the failure of a paradigm to reduce anomalies to lawfiilness 
is perceived (by scientists) to be as greater than the power of the paradigm to 
force nature into a crisis of results. 
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Crisis science is characterized by a general recognition that the ruling 
paradigm is no longer functioning effectively. This recognition may come from 
the community of scientists working within the tradition of the disabled 
paradigm. Break-down comes with proliferation of new ideas, theories, 
methods, and alternative paradigms. 
When one of the new paradigms begins to emerge as a contender for 
succession, the resuh is a conflict between the new and the old paradigm. Since 
paradigms are pervasive in determining worldviews, the ground rules for 
deciding among competing paradigms are not the same as those that operate 
within a single tradition. Kuhn argues that not only are the worldviews of 
different paradigmatic traditions different, but, in a sense, the world itself is 
different for the practitioners in different paradigmatic traditions. 
The ultimate resolution of paradigm conflicts results in the emergence of 
a new normal science tradition. According to Kuhn, such resolutions involve 
something akin to a gestalt shift. Critics were quick to conclude that, for Kuhn, 
scientific progress from one paradigm to another is fundamentally an irrational 
process, since the standards and values of one paradigm to another is a 
fundamentally irrational process. In responding to his critics, Kuhn sought to 
soften this implication by pointing out that there were certain values 
characteristic of science, such as simplicity, predictive accuracy, and 
requirement for consistency, that transcended particular disciplinary matrices. 
Thus, he argued, revolutionary science was both progressive and rational. 
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Alongside Kuhn was Imre Lakatos, who developed a blend of Kuhnian 
and Popperian elements that he labelled the 'methodology of scientific research 
programs'. He argued that the flindamental unit of assessment should be a 
research tradition such as Newtonian mechanics, rather than a single hypothesis 
or conjecture. These research programs consisted of a "hard core" of central 
symbolic generalizations, along with a "protective belt" of auxiliary 
hypotheses. Programs were progressive, when they focused on protecting the 
core from refutation. The resuhing model of scientific development was 
claimed to be a sophisticated falsificationist version of Popper's program that 
offered a response to what Lakatos saw as Kuhn's irrationalist view of 
scientific change. 
Feyerabend is another important philosopher of science. On the matter of 
falsifiability, Feyerabend argues that no theory is always consistent with all the 
relevant facts. Like Lakatos, he sees the use of ad-hoc postulates to save the 
leading paradigm as an essential to the progress of science. However, 
Feyerabend goes much further than Lakatos; taking example from the history 
of science, he claims that scientists often depart entirely from the scientific 
method when they use ad-hoc ideas to explain observations that are only later 
justified by theory. To Feyerabend ad-hoc hypotheses play an essential role; 
they provisionally make a new theory compatible with facts until the theory to 
be defended can be supported by the other theories. 
On the matter of paradigm-shift, Feyerabend emphasises Kuhn's idea 
that the reigning paradigm deeply influences interpretation of observed 
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phenomena. However, he adds to this by suggesting that in the paradigm model 
the reigning paradigm would also have a shifting influence on the incoming 
theory; instead of being dictated by agreement with observation alone, the new 
theory must also concur with the old one. Putting the two points together, 
Feyerabend concludes that it is impossible to view the progress of science in 
terms of one set of methodological rules that is always used by scientists: such 
a 'scientific method' would in fact limit the activities of scientist and lock up 
scientific progress. According to universal and fixed rules, Feyerabend 
suggests that science often progresses by ad-hoc guesses that break the rules by 
the attitude of "anything goes". This "anything goes" is formally known as 
epistemological anarchism. 
Feyerabend on the other hand rejected the idea that scientists are rational 
creatures entirely. In his book "Against Method" he argues that scientists do 
not, in fact, follow any one given method but are much less rational than their 
propaganda makes them out to be. 
Toulmin has laid emphasis on the question of the rationality of scientific 
discovery. He has provided an anti-positivisfic account of rationality of science. 
He has brought out that scientific arguments and the arguments advanced in 
other disciplines expect the pure sciences are imperious to description or 
explanation in terms of formal logic. Neither deductive nor inductive methods 
of inference can capture the enterprise of scientific research. It is rather the 
method of representation - a sort of graphical, pictorial image of given physical 
phenomena. That plays a pivotal role in our understanding of science. 
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As a philosopher of science, Toulmin brings out the limits of 
methodology. He is convinced that formal methods cannot be helpful in trying 
to understand the nature of scientific practices. A scientist has to go beyond 
methodology and formal logic in order to carry out scientific research. A 
scientific discovery is not a function of methodological instructions or formal 
algorithms. It is rather through professionally trained imagination that we can 
negotiate any real scientific breakthrough. The scientific reasoning can 
fruitfully be compared with juristic reasoning. Like legal regulations, scientific 
laws too are not universal by definition. They need to be suspended or changed 
in the light of given circumstances. A scientific situation resembles a legal 
situation for both of them negotiate new or complex disputes which cannot be 
successfully explained by pervious rules and methods. Sometimes both the 
scientists and the jurist have to go beyond the established procedures and 
creatively workout a new scientific paradigm or a new legal paradigm. In view 
of the same, Toulmin suggests that, we need always to challenge the rules of 
rationality and deem the results of our research as tentative and revocable. 
Rationality is the characterizing feature of Laudan's model of science. 
However, even more fundamental than the notion of rationality is the notion of 
progress in his account of science. He does not define progress in terms of 
rationality; he rather defines rationality in terms of progress. "In a phrase, my 
proposal will be that rationality consists in making the most progressive theory 
choices, not that progress consists in accepting successively the most 
rationality theories." 
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Laudan's account of science has two characterising features. Firstly, any 
adequate model of science must be able to accommodate scientific change. 
Secondly, any adequate account of science must recognize that scientific 
rationality and progress are not linked to the truth, verisimilitude, 
corroboration, falsifiability etc of scientific theories but with their problem-
solving effectiveness. Laudan brings out that scientific evolution entails that we 
make a distinction between mini and maxi theories. A mini theory is a 'very 
specific set of related doctrines.... which can be utilized for making specific 
experimental predictions and for giving detailed explanations of natural 
phenomena'. A mini theory cannot negotiate a change in view of the fact that 
any slight change in such a theory can provide us the sufficient warrant to 
stipulate it as a new theory. 
On the other hand, a maxi theory, according to Laudan, is a research 
tradition. It is comprised of a number of ongoing and proceeding theories and 
sets of doctrines and assumptions. It has a set of metaphysical and 
methodological commitments as well. Thus a maxi theory or a research 
tradition is much more general and much less testable. A research tradition is 
often characterized by powerful normative elements. In view of the same, it is 
weak on explanatory power, productivity and testability. All research traditions 
go through different and often mutually contradictory formulations. A research 
tradition negotiates evolution by recourse to successive replacement of its 
constituent theories. At times, even some of its basic or core elements are 
imperceptibly given up and replaced by another set of basic elements. All 
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research traditions, at any given point of time, are characterised by certain 
metaphysical and methodological commitments. However, even such 
predilections can gradually change or shade off. 
According to Laudan, problem-solving is the fundamental aim of all 
intellectual endeavours. Such solutions shape up as theories in scientific 
research. Sometimes day-to-day problems can become genuine scientific 
problems. Sometimes common sense solutions can graduate to genuine 
scientific theories. Broadly speaking, Laudan divides problems into two 
categories - empirical and conceptual problems. An empirical problem is 
'anything about the natural world which strikes us as odd and in need of 
explanation.' It is true that, a genuine empirical problem has to be about the 
world. However, in order to be deemed or defined as an empirical problem, it 
need not necessarily be accurately describing a real state of affairs. The 
minimum requirement is that a competent scientific researcher must think it to 
be describing an actual state of affairs. Furthermore, a problem-solving theory 
need not be true. No theory so far has been certified to be demonstrably true. 
The theories too need not be certified to be fully free of anomalies with view to 
functioning as solutions to the problems. Nevertheless, only in the context of a 
theory can a problem be deemed or defined to be a problem and there is only 
one way of solving a problem, viz; by deriving an approximate statement of the 
problem from a particular theory. 
Laudan classifies empirical problems into three kinds; (1) Solved 
problems (2) Unsolved problems (3) Anomalous problems. 
92 
1. Unsolved problems: Those empirical problems which have not yet been 
adequately solved by any theory. 
2. Solved problems: Those empirical problems which have been 
adequately solved by a theory. 
3. Anomalous problems: Those empirical problems which a particular 
theory has not solved, but which one or more of its competitors have. 
To begin with, theory related problems pose a difficulty with regard to an 
'unsolved problem'. If we start with assumption that the state of affairs can be 
deemed problematic only in relation to some theory, then any account of a state 
of affairs which is neither derivable nor compatible with any theory can be 
deemed to be only a curiosity. We cannot deem it to be a problem. Laudan's 
solution to such difficulties is to demote unsolved problems to the status of 
'potential problems' pending their solutions. 
Laudan concedes that meaning may not be theory-independent. It is 
possible that language embedding our conceptual networks may furnish an 
inextricable 'tint' to what we perceive. Nevertheless, Laudan is not necessarily 
bothered by the so-called problems posed by the thesis of 
'incommensurability'. It is not necessary that any of two theories have got to 
conflict because all terms are theory-laden. No state of affairs can operate as 
the same problem for two different theories. In view of the same, no anomalous 
problems need necessarily arise in this regard. Laudan argues that it is wrong to 
assume that two theories can be compared only if theoretical assumptions of 
the problem under consideration are different from theories attempting their 
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solutions. Besides, theories need not necessarily be compared on the basis of 
commensurability. There are other parameters for comparison such as internal 
consistency, simplicity, precision of prediction etc. 
Laudan also underlines the significance of conceptual problems in 
scientific research. As a matter of fact, conceptual problems are more serious 
for a scientific theory than the empirical problems. It so happens that empirical 
problems are not that intimately linked to theories as are conceptual problems. 
In comparison to conceptual problems, empirical problems enjoy a measure of 
autonomy. The conceptual problems have no independent existence; they are 
existentially linked to theoretical constructions. Laudan subdivides conceptual 
problems into two; firstly, conceptual problems such as inconsistency, 
vagueness and uncertainty can arise within a particular system. Secondly, 
conceptual problems may arise from a disagreement between two rationally 
justifiable theories. There are various elements in the world views, research 
traditions and even at the level of specific theories which do conflict with one 
another. In the same way, Darwinian biology was quite compatible with the 
scientific developments during Victorian era. However, Darwinian biology was 
radically incompatible with highly entrenched metaphysical and teleological 
theories such as essentialism. Laudan concedes that such anomalies and 
discrepancies do happen in the ongoing evolution of scientific investigations. 
Laudan is happy even to extend this line of reasoning to principles of theology, 
metaphysics and methodology - to the extent such principles have been 
instrumental in successfully solving scientific problems in the past. Laudan's 
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notion of rationality is much broader than the rationality espoused by other 
philosophers of science. Laudan says that even non-empirical and non-
scientific factors can legitimately contribute in the rational development of 
science. It can be argued that nineteenth century scientists where perfectly 
rational in accepting Darwinian biology as it rested on scientific causality or 
naturalistic assumptions or it indicated the perfectible nature of human 
evolution. We can argue with equal plausibility and rationality that Darwinian 
biology was acceptable as it was not sufficiently inductive. We can also take 
the stand that Darwin's theory was not acceptable because it was not in accord 
with the wisdom and beneficence of God or it constituted a virtual degradation 
of man. 
Laudan is not in agreement with Feyerabend's stand, viz; 'anything 
goes'. To begin with, he draws our attention towards non-cognitive elements in 
our taken sides in the domain of science. For example, those scientists who 
accepted Darwin's biology with a view to ingratiating themselves with the 
Darwinian power elite or rejected it for fear of subverting democracy do not 
have a shred of scientific or rational credibility. Moreover, we cannot say that 
all cognitive influences do have an equal good impact. For instance, before the 
arrival of Darwinian paradigm, natural theology was on the way to decline. 
Thus Laudan sees science as a second-order activity; it has only 
descriptive force and no rational or normative force. He push's aside the truth 
question in favour of problem-solving effectiveness. He understands truth as 
correspondence and correspondence is unrealizable. Explanations are valid and 
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acceptable until falsified. If truth, not rationality, were science's aim, then that 
aim would be Utopian and science could be shown to be neither progressive in 
the comparative progress of its solutions, nor judged in terms of our aims and 
values. But it does not for that reason, discover truth. 
But truth need not be understood as correspondence. Another option is 
possible in which doctrines can be envisaged as being simultaneously 
referential. Reference need not be predicated on an equivalence of meaning 
between discourse and reality. The reference of doctrines, as second-order 
language, is not an ostensive reference pointing to a state of affairs but is a 
prospective or heuristic reference. They do not describe the world as it is but as 
it could be. Doctrines project practical possibilities of life and of being in the 
world. The truth of doctrines can be defined in terms of Laudan's concept of 
realizability and not correspondence. Such truths can be measured, for 
example, in well-designed outcome and longitudinal studies in terms of 
success. Success is judged, as Laudan argued, in accord with goals and values. 
The upshot of Laudan's philosophy of science is that the fundamental objective 
of scientific research is trying to explore or discover solution of cognitive 
problems which are basically of two types - empirical and conceptual 
problems. Scientific theories are not to be apprised in terms of truth or 
falsehood but in relation to their problem-solving effectiveness. A theory 
having greater problem-solving effectiveness is more apt and relevant or better 
than a theory with lesser problem-solving effectiveness. It is the problem-
solving effectiveness of scientific theories that characteristically defines 
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scientific progress. Maximisation of scientific progress constitutes the essence 
of scientific rationality. However, theories go on changing and scientific 
rationality consists in using the best available specific theories. It is a research 
tradition which suggests and sets problems, evaluates their significance and 
suggests ways of solving them. In view of the same, an evaluation of a 
scientific progress or scientific rationality entails comparison of research 
tradition. Whether any given research tradition is adequate or inadequate is 
itself a fiincfion of the problem-solving effectiveness of those scientific theories 
which together constitute a research tradition. 
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CRITICISM 
Philosophers of science have advanced highly accomplished theories or 
accounts of scientific progress. Every theory or account can have its merits and 
demerits or strengthens and weaknesses. However, what is fundamentally 
important is that they advance highly conflicting views with regard to scientific 
progress. There is wide spread disagreement among philosophers of science in 
this regard. They have not been able to provide a consensual and coherent 
account of scientific progress. They disagree as much with regard to scientific 
progress as classical metaphysicians were disagreeing with regard to nature of 
reality or modem European philosophers were disagreeing with regard to origin 
and nature of knowledge. Now, whom we are to accept or whom we are to 
reject, is a highly critical question. We have six accomplished accounts of 
scientific progress. They are presenting radically different theories with regard 
to scientific progress. There can be other philosophers of science who can also 
advance various other types of theories with regard to scientific progress. In 
such a situation it gets exceedingly difficult to accept any account as true and 
rational and any other account as false and irrational. 
Like most philosophers, Laudan believes that by and large science 
makes cognitive progress and that the development of science is more or less 
rational. 
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Problem-solving activity is central to scientific research, according to 
Larry Laudan. Most of scientific problems are generated while pursuing prior 
problems. Accordingly, sound judgments regarding success and progress in 
science require delimitation of the appropriate field of problems and 
comparison of the total problem-solving effectiveness of the various relevant 
theories. Such deeply historical and comparative judgments are not adequately 
analyzed by any traditional account of scientific rationality. Laudan considers it 
rational to pursue a theory when its relative rate of progress (of solving or of 
promising to solve scientific problems) is high, and when its overall success as 
a problem solver is also high in comparison with those of its competitors. 
According to Laudan, problem-solving effectiveness is the measure of 
progress in science. Accordingly, he must provide adequate means of 
identifying and individuating scientific problems. He does not attack this task 
face-to-face, nor does he succeed in it. Nonetheless, he contributes usefully to 
it and to the problem of providing criteria of adequacy for the solution of 
scientific problems. He divides these problems into two principle classes: 
empirical and conceptual. At any given time serious theories has solved certain 
empirical problems and fail to solve others. Among the later, those which have 
been solved by competitors count as anomalies. They do not falsify or force 
rejection of the theory, but they do cast significant doubt on its problem-
solving effectiveness. The conceptual problems a theory faces are either 
internal or external. The latter include conflicts with neighbouring theories 
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(e.g., conflict between Copemican astronomy and pre-Galilean mechanics) and 
conflict with accepted methodological norms. 
We can measure the overall problem-solving effectiveness of a theory 
by assessing the number and importance of the empirical problems which the 
theory solves. It is from such effectiveness that we can deduct the number and 
importance of the anomalies and conceptual problems which the theory 
generates. Laudan explores and examines problems in theory evaluation. 
Although he does not produce the Utopian calculus he requires namely one in 
which each unsolved anomaly and conceptual problems count so much against 
it, he identifies various factors which increase the evaluative importance of a 
problem (e.g., acquiring the status of an anomaly, serving as a model for a large 
class of problems) and others which decrease its evaluative weight like being 
shifted to the domain of another theory. Besides, he offers a way around the 
Quine-Duhem problem of fixing the blame for predictive failure and the credit 
for problem solutions. Since his concern is not truth but problem-solving 
effectiveness, the entire theory complex employed in dealing with a problem 
shares equally in the blame for failure or the credit for success. 
For Larry Laudan, a scientific theory covers a range of phenomena 
falling under two ideal types. Firstly, there are determinate set of specific, 
interrelated axiomatizable doctrine (e.g., Maxwell's theory of 
electromagnetism). Secondly, a theory covers a set of general assumptions 
about the entities and processes in a domain of study, and about the appropriate 
methods to be used for investigating the problems and constructing the theories 
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in that domain. The relations between theories and research traditions are a 
major source of conceptual problems: the methodology or ontology of a 
research tradition may fit at well with a particular theory when a scientist is 
forced to develop an account for certain phenomena. Nevertheless, research 
traditions are not dispensable; they guide the development of theories and help 
rationalize and justify the pursuit and acceptance of particular theories. Success 
and rapid progress in a research tradition justify the search for a theory along 
the lines prescribed by its ontology and methodology and contribute to the 
positive appraisal of theories well integrated into that tradition. Since research 
traditions gradually evolve and are able to take over theories formerly 
belonging to unknown traditions, evaluation of their success, like that of 
narrower theories, is a thoroughly historical process. Evaluation of progress, 
and hence rationality, in science requires evaluation of the problem-solving 
effectiveness of both kinds of theories. 
Laudan has often underlined that evaluation of scientific theories is 
comparative. If so, his argument in favour of his own theory of scientific 
progress is radically incomplete, for inspite of specific criticism of Kuhn, 
Lakatos and others, he does not set forth their theories carefully enough to 
allow the reader to estimate the full force of the specific criticisms he directs 
against his competitors. 
Laudan often stresses that his system of theory assessment is workable. 
In fact he deems it to be one of its major virtues. But, in the absence of a 
rigorous calculus, he does not show convincingly that informal assessments of 
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problem-solving effectiveness and rates of progress need yield consensus 
except, perhaps long after the fact, when the relative importance of problems 
has been settled in the light of subsequent theories and empirical results. It is 
therefore, not clear whether his methodology is any more workable than 
Lakatos's, in which one can judge the importance of problems and the 
adequacy of solutions only with hindsight and cannot discount any idea, no 
matter how wild, on the spot. 
Laudan while rejecting traditional philosophical attempts, at solving 
anomalies encountered in various theoretical formulations, does not offer any 
indefeasible solution to the problem under-consideration. He is a hardcore 
epistemological pessimist. He does not define the aims and objectives of 
scientific research in terms of truth. He does so because according to him we 
can never recognise true theories. We cannot even determine which of the 
theories sound to be increasingly approximating to the truth. Instead, Laudan 
tries something more practical, something that could be used in real scientific 
cases. Instead of trying to measure up the rationality and truth of scientific 
discourse, Laudan, offers us the criterion of problem-solving effecfiveness. 
Now, it can be plausibly argued that it is as difficult to measure up problem-
solving effectiveness as it is to measure up rationality and truth of scientific 
theories. 
Laudan does not have the courage to face the philosophical difficulties 
encountered by other philosophers of science. He is avoiding the issues with 
regard to confirmation, corroboration, content, verisimilitude etc. He avoids the 
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puzzles about incommensurability as well. Laudan tries to simply difficulties 
by defining progress in simpler, clearer and easier concepts. However, Laudan 
does not demonstrate that his quest for simplicity and clarity leads to any 
solutions of various difficulties encountered in the long drawn-out scientific 
research. Laudan's 'research tradition' account while focusing on problems 
does not provide us a better understanding of the dynamics of science. He fails 
to bring out the motivations which inspire scientific investigations. 
It is not clear as to what a scientific problem is, according to Laudan. 
What counts a solution or a satisfactory solution of problems under 
consideration? Laudan thinks that scientific problems arise when someone 
thinks that a particular claim about the world is true and deserves an 
explanation. This sounds to be a subjective or sociological account of scientific 
problems. Even if we accept Laudan's psychological and sociological 
dimensions of scientific problems, Laudan will still have to explain as to why 
some facts are felt to be in need of explanation whereas, other facts do not 
press for an explanation. He will have to explain which facts should be taken 
seriously and which should be consigned to sidelines of scientific research. 
Else his account of scientific problems will be highly vulnerable to individual 
idiosyncrasies. Laudan will have to provide a really fight theory of what 
actually counts as an acceptable solution to any problem under consideration. 
Laudan emphasises that, "the criteria for what counts as solving a 
problem have evolved so much that what was once regarded as an adequate 
solufion ceases to be regarded as such" P.25 (1977). It can be conceded that the 
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substance of solutions changes in course of time, especially as our frontiers of 
knowledge expand. With increase in knowledge problems change, what count 
as solutions change, the standards of the precision and accuracy of the 
experimental measurements change. However, Laudan cannot substantiate that 
logical and epistemological criteria for determining the problem and their 
solutions go on changing in the field of scientific research. Laudan says that a 
solution of a scientific problem is that which confirms to the standards 
operating at the time. However, Laudan does not tabulate those very standards 
for, according to him, they go on changing as well. Thus, Laudan effectively 
fails to establish as to what counts as problem in science and what counts its 
solution. Laudan cannot present a theory of scientific progress unless he 
presents an account of scientific standards. Laudan is not providing such an 
account. 
We may accept Laudan's claim that evaluation of theories needs 
comparative analysis. However, he does not subject his own theory of scientific 
progress to comparative analysis. He does not compare his theory of problem-
solving effectiveness with the theories of Kuhn and Lakatos, in spite of their 
specific criticisms of Laudan's interpretation of science. Laudan's own 
criticism of Kuhn, Lakatos and others is also not clearly brought out for he 
does not delimit the field of his problems. He does not offer any convincing 
argument that could establish the superiority of his own theory in terms of 
problem solving effectiveness and also specify the relative weakness of the 
theories advanced by his competitors. We cannot know the workability of 
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Laudan's system. We cannot be sure whether his methodology is 
comparatively workable or not. 
Laudan radical espousal of instrumentalism is neither prudent nor 
judicious. He advocates that rationality consists in maximising the number of 
solved empirical problems and minimizing the number of unsolved conceptual 
problems. Such an analysis, according to Laudan, needs not to be integrated to 
an analysis of rationality in terms of seeking approach to the truth. Laudan's 
extreme instrumentalism makes it impossible to delimit conceptual problems as 
well. On Laudan's analysis, there is no wrong in employing conflicting modes 
of description with refrence to various phenomena in various contexts. It is so 
because truth is not an issue at all. We cannot be sure whether Laudan's 
instrumentalist approach does help or hinder the development of his theory of 
progress. 
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